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ACCESS TO INFORMATION, ACCESS TO JUSTICE:
THE ROLE OF PRESUIT INVESTIGATORY DISCOVERY
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman*
What is the relationship between access to information and access to justice? Pri-
vate parties obviously have many publicly available points of access to the
information they seek in order to file a lawsuit. Lawyers can talk to their clients
and other willing witnesses. Documents can be gathered. Specific statutes may
sometimes permit information to be obtained before a formal lawsuit is brought.
On other occasions, however information needed or desired will lie solely within
the exclusive knowledge and control of another The ability of private parties to
compel the production of information, documents, or testimony before litigation
rarely has been seriously considered as a factor bearing on access to court. Along
with a lack of treatment of the doctrinal sources of authority, no attempt has been
made by academic commentators or y those most closely involved in civil proce-
dural reform to gather empirical evidence to determine how important the right to
take presuit investigatory discovery is to the institution and maintenance of civil
suits. This Article seeks to fill these vital gaps that exist in the literature and in the
public debates, more generally, over access to justice. After examining the available
authority in the federal and state courts, the author gathers and reports on origi-
nal empirical research conducted on the use of presuit investigatory discovery by
private parties. That data comes from Texas, where the state rule provides the
broadest grant of authority to prospective litigants to invoke judicial process for
investigatory purposes. The empirical evidence from Texas may reasonably be read
as indicating widespread use of the state's presuit discovery rule: one out of two
lawyer and judge respondents reported at least one experience in which a presuit
deposition was taken, Relatedly, it appears that approximately sixty percent of the
time the deposition was taken to investigate a potential claim before suit was filed;
the remaining forty percent of depositions were secured for the purpose of perpetuat-
ing testimony. Examining the available data, the author argues that there are
good reasons to believe that the perceived need to satisfy formal legal requirements
for bringing suit, as well as the pull of practical considerations, may plausibly ex-
plain the use of the state's presuit discovery rule. Read in this manner, the
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empirical evidence suggests that an important relationship exists between access to
information and access to justice.
INTRODUCTION
In his recent, best-selling book about instinctive reactions and
human behavior, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, Mal-
colm Gladwell briefly addressed the subject of medical malpractice
lawsuits:
Analyses of malpractice lawsuits show that there are highly
skilled doctors who get sued a lot and doctors who make lots
of mistakes and never get sued. At the same time, the over-
whelming number of people who suffer an injury due to the
negligence of a doctor never file a malpractice suit at all. In
other words, patients don't file lawsuits because they've been
harmed by shoddy medical care. Patients file lawsuits because
they've been harmed by shoddy medical care and something
else happens to them.
What is that something else? It's how they were treated, on a
personal level, by their doctor.'
Although his is a popular account rather than a scholarly one,
Gladwell is right that several prior studies have shown that the
number of claims actually filed is quite low as compared to the best
estimates of the rates at which negligent and other actionable con-
duct may occur.2 He is also correct that one factor shown to
account for the decision of at least some plaintiffs to bring suit is
the nature of the previous interpersonal relationship between pa-
l. MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 40
(2005).
2. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 69-76 (1993) (referencing HAR-
VARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK (1990)) (estimating
that patients were seven times more likely to be a victim of medical negligence than to file a
medical malpractice claim); see also PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY,
EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 24 (1985) (studying rates of negligence in California hospi-
tals and concluding that "at most 1 in 10 negligent injuries resulted in a claim"); Lori B.
Andrews, MedicalError and Patient Claiming In a Hospital Setting 12 (Am. Bar Found., Working
Paper No. 9316, 1993) (studying negligence rates at a Chicago hospital and reporting that
of 1047 patients who experienced a medical error, only thirteen filed a claim). See generally
Michael J. Saks, Medical Malpractice: Facing Real Problems and Finding Real Solutions, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 693, 702-03 (1994) (discussing data reported by Weiler).
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tient and doctor (or other caregiver).' In dramatically emphasizing
the role of human instinctive reactions, however, Gladwell "thin-
slices" other critical factors out of the litigation calculus.
Much work already has been done addressing barriers to access
to justice. One of the principal, though certainly not exclusive,
points of focus has been on the financial burdens and barriers to
seeking legal redress, such as a party's ability to retain a lawyer to
take her case.4 In addition to financial considerations, other factors
may account for whether one who is injured brings a claim for re-
lief. Known factors, most of which have been addressed in the
context of medical negligence claims, include lack of awareness
that an injury was wrongful or actionable, social stigmas against
bringing suit, prior communications and disclosures made to pa-
tients, and, yes, how the patient was treated, on a personal level, by
his doctor.5
This Article explores another factor that may influence a pro-
spective plaintiff's ability to initiate a claim for civil relief. In
3. Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice
Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361-63 (1992); Wendy Levinson et al.,
Physician-Patient Communication: The Relationship with Malpractice Claims Among Primary Care
Physicians and Surgeons, 277 JAMA 553, 553 (1997) (examining how medical doctors com-
municated with their patients and suggesting the prudence of "specific and teachable
communication behaviors associated with fewer malpractice claims for primary care physi-
cians"); Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle
Medical Grievances, 24 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 105, 110-11 (1990).
4. See, e.g., CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVS. AND THE'PUB., ABA, LEGAL NEEDS AND
CIVILJUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS: MAJOR FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL
NEEDS STUDY 3-10 (1994) (finding approximately two out of three potentially compensable
civil claims not filed by moderate-income Americans and reporting that a majority of
Americans did not seek help from the public justice system primarily out of concern about
the expense of doing so or because seeking relief through the courts "would not help"); see
also National Center of State Courts et al., A Market-Driven Approach to CivilJustice Reform
(2000), http://a2j.kentlaw.edu/a2j/concept.cfm (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) ("For many consumers with legal disputes involving small amounts
in controversy (eg., less than $25,000), access to the courts for appropriate dispute resolu-
tion is more theoretic than real. For claims in excess of the jurisdictional limit of a small
claims court, consumers are faced with the bewildering complexity of municipal or superior
court procedures.... Because of these barriers, effective access to the courts often depends
upon legal representation. Yet legal representation is unaffordable and, as a practical matter,
unavailable to consumers in small stakes cases."). See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS
TOJUSTICE (2004).
5. Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Doctor-Patient Relationships, in SUING FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 50, 69 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1993) (noting that "problems with commu-
nication between doctors and patients were often crucial factors in precipitating individuals
to file suit"); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093
(1996); T. H. Gallagher et al., Patients' and Physicians'Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure of Medi-
cal Errors, 289 JAMA 1001 (2003); Andrews, supra note 2, at 7. See generally William L.F.
Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 7ransformation of Disputes: Nam-
ing, Blaming, Claiming ... , 15 LAw & Soc'y REV. 631, 633-37 (1980-81) (describing
elongated process from recognition of injury to institution of suit).
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particular, it focuses on the relationship between access to informa-
tion and access to justice. Private parties obviously have many
publicly available points of access to the information they seek.
Lawyers can talk to their clients and to willing witnesses. Docu-
ments can be gathered from willing sources. Specific statutes may
sometimes authorize the production of information (and, less of-
ten, sworn testimony) before a formal lawsuit is commenced.
On other occasions, however, information needed or desired
will lie solely within the exclusive knowledge and control of an-
other. For this very reason, some courts have expressed reluctance
to impose sanctions before there has been an opportunity for dis-
covery where a claim is said to lack evidentiary support. This is
especially true in certain kinds of cases, such as civil rights cases.6
But civil rights claimants are hardly the only ones who may face
difficulties accessing information before suit.7 Put slightly differ-
ently, it is quite reasonable to believe that prospective claimants
face different challenges and varying degrees of access to informa-
tion, a phenomenon Robert Bone refers to as the problem of
"asymmetric information.""
6. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279 (2d Cir. 1986) (refusing, in a
civil rights suit based on police misconduct, to impose sanctions where "it is extremely
unlikely that before formal discovery any citizen would or could be in possession of [suffi-
cient] information" to support the claim and noting further that "if sanctions were to bar
possible exploration of such claims, the [governmental] agency would be effectively immu-
nized even if it were engaged in unconstitutional policies and practices"). But see infra text
accompanying notes 131-147 (discussing ways in which formal impediments to suit, such as
certification requirements, can deter the filing of claims where inadequate information is
available at the outset of litigation).
7. See Randall S. Thomas & KennethJ. Martin, Using State Inspection Statutes for Discov-
ery in Federal Securities Fraud Actions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 69, 71-73 (1997) (discussing challenges
in bringing shareholder derivative actions because corporate fraud is often difficult to detect
without use of formal post-filing discovery, particularly after passage of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act in 1995); Conrad M. Shumadine et al., Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
and Literary Property Course Handbook Series, 604 PLI/Pat 15 (2000) (observing that in libel
actions against media defendants "evidence concerning the critical fault element lies with
the defendant"). Several studies of closed-claim medical malpractice files have also shown
that the desire to access information is one reason at least some claimants file suit. Hickson
et al., supra note 3; William M. Sage, Medical Liability & Patient Safety, 22 HEALTH AFF. 26, 31
(2003); see also Bernard S. Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes
in Texas, 1988-2002, 2J. EMpiRtAL L. STUns. 207-259 (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=770844 (citing Hickson, et. al., supra note 3, and discussing patient desire for in-
formation before the suit).
8. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 519, 542 (1997)
(discussing informational imbalances between plaintiffs and defendants); see also Carl To-
bias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 498 (1989) (observing that civil
rights claimants "rarely will possess or be able to obtain information pertinent to their cases"
and that "[c]oncomitantly, in numerous civil rights suits, considerable information impor-
tant to the factual preparation of complaints that appear specific will be in the records or
minds of government or corporate defendants and cannot be secured before these plead-
ings must be filed, becoming available only during discovery").
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Yet, the ability of private parties to compel the production of in-
formation, documents, or testimony before litigation rarely has
been seriously considered as a factor bearing on access to court.
This ought to be at least a little puzzling since nearly all other deci-
sions in the course of litigation-from a defendant's collection of
sufficient facts to respond to the plaintiffs complaint,9 to a plain-
tiff's bid to marshal her evidentiary proof to stave off premature
dismissal by summary judgment,'0 to the shared interest of the par-
ties in amassing adequate information to make informed decisions
regarding voluntary settlement of the dispute"-are affected by a
party's access to information.
Writing about the government's use of its administrative sub-
poena powers before formal proceedings have commenced,
Graham Hughes made the point plainly: "Litigation depends on
information.', 2 The government may invoke its statutory subpoena
powers to obtain information before instituting a criminal, civil, or
administrative matter, but to what extent do private parties also
have the right to compel information before litigation?
The scholarly literature provides few well-developed accounts of
the extent to which the law recognizes the right of prospective
claimants to invoke judicial process for investigatory purposes.""
Beyond the lack of treatment of the doctrinal sources of authority,
no attempt has been made by academic commentators or by those
most closely involved in the shaping of the civil justice system's
rules and institutional features-from legislatures and advisory rule
9. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b) (requiring that, as to each claim asserted, a defending
party must admit or deny the averments or state that she lacks knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averment); Greenbaum v. United States, 360
F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (striking defendant's answer for failure to conduct a reasonable
investigation in answering complaint).
10. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("When a motion for summaryjudgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.").
11. See, e.g., Randall C. Grasso, From Where I Sit: Tips for More Effective Negotiations at Me-
diation, 23 THE ADvoc. 34 (2003) (detailing numerous ways in which information enables
parties to maximize mediation and settlement processes).
12. Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury: Converging Streams of
Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 47 VAND. L. REv. 573, 574 (1994).
13. Probably the best, notable exception is Nicholas A. Kronfeld, Note, The Preservation
and Discovery of Evidence Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27, 78 GEO. L.J. 593 (1990) (pro-
viding a well-researched doctrinal account of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27, paying
careful historical attention to the sources on which the Advisory Committee's proposed
language was based). See also Bone, supra note 8, at 553-76 (using game theory models to
study "frivolous" litigation and briefly considering presuit investigation of information as
one theoretical factor influencing litigant behavior). See generally Patrick E. Higginbotham,
Depositions or Other Discovery Before Action or Pending Appeal, 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 27 (3d ed. 2006) (treatise examination of Rule 27).
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committees, to state supreme courts and bar associations-to
gather empirical evidence to determine how important the right to
invoke judicial process before litigation for investigatory purposes
is to the institution and maintenance of civil suits.
This Article seeks to fill these vital gaps in the literature over the
role of presuit investigatory discovery and in the public debates,
more generally, over access to justice. To this end, it examines the
scope of rule- and common law-based authority in federal and state
courts permitting presuit discovery. Part I reveals that formal inves-
tigatory discovery tools are rarely afforded to prospective litigants
before litigation has commenced and that, where available, the
privilege of using presuit discovery for investigatory purposes is
given only episodically, for particular persons (or entities) in a lim-
ited number of contexts.
After developing a clearer picture of the cramped limits of pre-
suit investigatory discovery, Part II assesses the significance of this
finding in terms of the larger problem of access to the civil justice
system. In other words, to what extent does it matter-both from
the individual and institutional perspective-that most private par-
ties, most of the time, are unable to invoke judicial process for
investigatory purposes before suit? To answer this question, the Ar-
ticle considers empirical data on the use of presuit investigatory
discovery by private parties. That data comes from Texas, where the
state rule provides the broadest grant of authority to prospective
litigants to invoke judicial process for investigatory purposes. The
Texas data is primarily derived from two surveys created for pur-
poses of this examination and sent to (i) approximately 6000
lawyer members of the Litigation Section of the State Bar of Texas
and (ii) roughly 600 state district and county court judges, inquir-
ing of their experiences with the rule that authorizes private
litigants to conduct presuit discovery.14 Along with these two sur-
veys, this Article also considers the available (though incomplete)
public data on the Texas rule. To my knowledge, no previous effort
to collect this information has been made.
Probably the most important finding mined from the data con-
cerns the frequency with which claimants employ Texas's rule. On
this point, the data has much to tell. The empirical evidence from
Texas indicates widespread use of the state's presuit discovery rule.
Approximately one out of two lawyer and judge respondents re-
ported at least one experience with a presuit deposition. Parties
took the deposition to investigate a potential claim before filing
14. Results from the two surveys are available at http://www.law.uh.edu/faculty/
lhoffman/article.
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suit approximately sixty percent of the time; the remaining forty
percent of presuit depositions were secured for the purpose of
perpetuating testimony. On the assumption that prospective and
actual litigants in Texas face roughly the same barriers to judicial
access as claimants elsewhere, one plausible inference from these
findings is that, if given the opportunity, prospective litigants in
other jurisdictions would similarly make use of an expanded pre-
suit discovery rule.'
The Article also considers what the data indicate about the rela-
tionship between informational access and judicial access.
Certainly, the available data from Texas gathered thus far cannot
be read to demonstrate definitively that the inability of prospective
claimants elsewhere to use judicial process for presuit investigatory
purposes impairs their ability to bring suit. Still, finding the rule's
diffuse use by lawyers on behalf of prospective claimants is impor-
tant because it raises, among other issues, the interesting question
of why the investigatory discovery is being sought.
One possible explanation is that prospective claimants and their
lawyers in Texas have been using the rule purely for strategic ad-
vantage, that they have not been compelled to do so in order to
bring a lawsuit and that, even without the presuit discovery, they
would still have sought legal redress. On this account, the data of-
fer little insight into the role investigatory discovery may play in
enabling prospective claimants to seek legal redress. Moreover, if
resort to the rule has been largely unnecessary, then this further
and more disturbingly suggests that lawyers and their clients may
be treating the broad grant of investigatory discovery in Texas like
a hunting or fishing license, allowing them to track down facts on
which a claim could be based.
While it is not entirely implausible that the presuit discovery
routinely sought in Texas has been unnecessary (which is to say,
rarely needed in order to bring suit), there are good reasons to
doubt that this explains the vast majority of presuit discovery prac-
tice in the state. A more plausible explanation may be that
information sought before litigation was perceived by the lawyer or
the prospective claimant (or both) to be necessary, either to satisfy
formal legal requirements for the institution and maintenance of a
claim, such as pleading or certification rules, or because practical
considerations made prudent the marshaling of sufficient factual
information at the outset to adequately assess the viability of pursu-
ing a claim.1
6
15. See infra Part II.D.1.
16. See infra Part II.D.2.
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Additionally, although the data reflect that there is widespread
use of the Texas rule, in the sense that nearly one-third of lawyer
respondents report having taken (or having received notice at least
once that someone else had taken) a presuit investigatory deposi-
tion, the practice would still be appropriately characterized as
quite limited when measured against the total volume of litigation.
The absolute figures gathered on presuit discovery in Texas corre-
spond with what lawyers interviewed for this paper revealed: a
lawyer might have twenty-five to thirty live cases on her docket each
year but only have had occasion to use (or receive notice that an-
other was using) the presuit discovery rule once in about five years
(that is, since the new rule went into effect in 1999). These fig-
ures hardly make the case that lawyers in Texas routinely seize
upon the broad grant of investigatory discovery to try to dig up
buried facts on which a claim could be based.
Nonetheless, the available empirical evidence on the use of pre-
suit discovery in the state remains incomplete and, as a result, I am
reluctant to-and do not-draw any broad normative conclusions
from it. Much additional work needs to be done to examine the
role presuit discovery plays in litigation decision-making in particu-
lar jurisdictions and, probably even more precisely, in particular
kinds of cases.
On the assumption, however, that rulemakers or legislators in
other jurisdictions do decide in the future to expand the scope of
presuit discovery, Part III explores some tentative lessons that the
doctrinal and empirical analyses may offer. The existing doctrinal
and empirical evidence suggests several safeguards worthy of con-
sideration for the orderly and fair administration of justice for all
participants.
One last point to make by way of introduction: while this Article
does not urge an across-all-jurisdictions adoption of broader civil
investigatory discovery, there is little doubt that even a sober ex-
amination of the subject is likely to provoke considerable
controversy. It cannot be divorced from the larger context in which
reform of the civil justice system inspires hotly contested debate.
Those who regard increased access to the courthouse as a social
good will look favorably on a finding that greater access to infor-
17. This is not to say, of course, that the incidence of use across the bar is uniform.
From interviews with several lawyers conducted for purposes of this Article, it is clear that
some are using the rule more frequently than others (copy of interview notes on file with
author).
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marion reduces barriers to the institution and maintenance of civil
suits; those who are more dubious of the virtues of litigation will
doubtless see it differently.
For those who begin with an immediate and visceral skepticism
to allowing private parties use of formal process for investigatory
purposes before suit, I want to suggest that it may be worth with-
holding judgment until the end of this examination and, for the
journey along the way, keeping questions like the following in
mind:
What, specifically, is abusive about permitting the investigation
of facts before the filing of a formal lawsuit when the information
sought is otherwise unavailable? If the prospective plaintiff has suf-
ficient evidence to bring suit, but chooses instead to investigate
further before filing (perhaps, for instance, to make certain that
the claims do more than merely meet a minimum pleading
threshold but bear significant evidentiary weight behind them),
how is the defendant worse off? Is there some benefit to the de-
fendant or to society by forcing the plaintiff to sue and use formal
post-filing discovery to gather the information she seeks? If infor-
mation lies solely in the possession of the potential defendant and
this information, if known, would permit the injured party to bring
a legitimate claim for relief, on what basis may the potential defen-
dant complain about having to produce the information before a
formal lawsuit has been brought against him? The taking of presuit
discovery is more problematic when the prospective plaintiff lacks
sufficient information to bring a case and there is no evidence
solely in the defendant's possession that would support a legitimate
claim for relief. But, and this really seems a critical point, how can
we distinguish ex ante between this circumstance and those occa-
sions when the defendant has committed some actionable wrong
but only he knows it?
I. AUTHORIZATION FOR PRESUIT DISCOVERY IN CIVIL LITIGATION
In both state and federal practice, litigants have an array of dis-
covery devices available to them after a suit has been initiated.
Nearly all jurisdictions, by rule, statute, or common law, allow pro-
spective parties to petition the court for discovery before filing a
formal lawsuit. In most instances, however, the right to use discov-
ery devices before litigation is narrowly tailored. Presuit discovery
typically may only be taken to preserve witness testimony when
there is a credible risk that the testimony may be lost if it is not re-
corded immediately. In several jurisdictions, the formal law permits
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discovery before suit for the broader purpose of confirming the
proper party to name as a defendant and/or to gather additional
information when necessary to institute legal proceedings. Even in
these forums, however, the formal law purports to disallow discov-
ery for the broader investigatory purpose of determining whether a
cause of action exists. Few jurisdictions stretch the presuit investi-
gatory discovery entitlement to its farthest limit.
A. The Default Rule: Civil Presuit Discovery Limited to
Perpetuating Testimony
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27, as interpreted by nearly all
courts and commentators, typifies the narrow scope of authority
given to private litigants to conduct presuit discovery. The rule
provides that "to perpetuate testimony regarding any matter that
may be cognizable in any court of the United States" an oral or
written deposition may be taken 8 "to prevent a failure or delay of
justice." I9 The text of the rule is not self-evidently clear: to perpetu-
ate for what purpose? The word perpetuate, standing alone, hardly
resolves the matter since all testimony that is put into written (or
video, or other electronic) form is testimony that has been per-
petuated, if the term is understood by its ordinary meaning of
"causing to continue" or "to keep in existence."2 0
18. FED R. Civ. P. 27(a)(1). Subsection (a)(3) further provides that "depositions may
then be taken in accordance with these rules; and the court may make orders of the charac-
ter provided for by Rules 34 and 35." While some courts have refused to allow requests for
the production of documents or for physical or mental exams unless they are sought in
connection with a deposition, most have read Rule 27 to allow Rule 34 or 35 discovery re-
quests to proceed apace before the filing of a formal suit. Higginbotham, supra note 13,
§ 27.13, at 27-35.
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(3). Another section of the rule, not relevant to the present
discussion, provides that a deposition may also be taken pending appeal of a previously
entered judgment. See FED. R. Civ. P. 27(b).
20. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 618 (4th ed.
2000). In a wonderful example, though, of lexicographic tail wagging, the Merriam Web-
ster's 1996 edition of the Dictionary of the Law defines perpetuate as meaning:
to preserve or make available (testimony) for later use at a trial by means of deposi-
tion esp. when the evidence so gathered would be otherwise unavailable or lost.
NOTE: Courts will not allow the perpetuation of testimony at a pretrial proceeding if
it appears to be an attempt to fish for useful material.
[VOL. 40:2
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While the text may be susceptible to a broader interpretation,
the federal courts have long and nearly unanimously found that
Rule 27 authorizes a presuit deposition only when the petitioner
has demonstrated that the witness's testimony might otherwise be
lost if it is not taken immediately, such as when a witness may be
suffering from a terminal illness or may be about to leave the juris-
diction's subpoena reach.2' Rule 27, the courts routinely observe,
"is not a substitute for broad discovery."22 According to the prevail-
ing understanding, this rule is not meant for investigating the facts
in advance of drafting a complaint.23 If the petitioner does not
know the substance of the evidence she seeks to perpetuate, resort
to the rule is unavailable.24
This restricted construction given to the language in Rule 27 is
almost certainly consistent with the intent of its drafters. As Steve
Subrin has shown, before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were adopted in 1938, there were few opportunities for private par-
ties to invoke judicial process to compel the production of
documents, information, or testimony before trial.25 Section 639 of
Title 28 of the United States Code provided the primary rule: tes-
timony was to be given in open court.2 6 Before the Federal Rules
went into effect, the notion that one side could discover the facts
supporting his adversary's case would have been unfamiliar to fed-
eral (and only slightly more familiar to state court) practitioners. A
broad right to take discovery before formal legal proceedings were
commenced would have raised significant concerns among many
on the bench and in the bar that the information discovered could
be used improperly to manufacture claims. Expressions of similar
concern about the search for factual information echo down the
centuries and are given voice in modern critiques that object to
liberalization of presuit discovery.
DICTIONARY OF THE LAW 361 (1996). The Webster's legal dictionary definition thus hints
at the narrow interpretation that the federal courts have routinely given to the words "to
perpetuate testimony" in Rule 27.
21. See generally 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2071, at 651 (2d ed. 1994); see also Higginbotham,
supra note 13, § 27 (treatise examination of Rule 27).
22. Deinlemar Compagnia Di Navigazione v. M/V Allegra, 198 F.3d 473, 485 (4th Cir.
1999); see also Ash v. Cort, 512 F.2d 909, 911-12 (3d Cir. 1975) ("Rule 27 properly applies
only in that special category of cases where it is necessary to prevent testimony from being
lost.... Rule 27 is not a substitute for discovery. It is available in special circumstances to
preserve testimony which could otherwise be lost.").
23. See, e.g., In reStorck, 179 F.R.D. 57,58 (D. Mass 1998).
24. See, e.g., Nevada v. O'Leary, 63 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 1995).
25. Steve Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal
Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REv. 691 (1998).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 639 (1928) (repealed by Rules Enabling Act).
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There were exceptions. Two code provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 644
and § 646, allowed pretrial depositions in law cases to record the
testimony of a witness who would likely be unavailable at trial.27 In
addition, litigants in federal courts adjudicating cases in law could
also invoke Equity Rules 47 and 58, the rules that authorized the
use of equitable bills of discovery.2 Even these procedures were
quite limited, however; they certainly bear little in common with
the discovery regime now found in Rules 26 through 37 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 9 A plausible case can be made
that, before 1938, there were no recognized examples of cases
where a court sanctioned use of the equitable bill of discovery to
investigate potential claims or to help determine the proper party
30to sue.
It is hardly surprising, then, given both the absence of any prior
authorization for investigatory presuit discovery and the clear in-
tent of the new rules to liberalize pleading practice, thereby
lowering the threshold of facts needed to institute and maintain a
civil suit,31 that the Advisory Committee members did not conceive
of Rule 27 as a presuit investigative tool. The 1937 Advisory Com-
mittee Note accompanying Rule 27 provides that the rule "offers a
simple method of perpetuating testimony in cases where it is usu-
27. These sections provided for deposition under dedimus potestatem and in per-
petuam.
In any case where it is necessary, in order to prevent a failure or delay ofjustice, any
of the courts of the United States may grant a dedimus potestatem to take depositions
according to common usage; and any district court, upon application to it as a court
of equity, may, according to the usages of chancery, direct depositions to be taken in
perpetuam rei memoriam, if they relate to any matters that may be cognizable in any
court of the United States....
28 U.S.C. § 644 (1928) (repealed by Rules Enabling Act). Section 646 described the
method for taking the deposition ordered and for sanctioning failures to comply with the
court's order. See 28 U.S.C. § 644 (1928) (repealed by Rules Enabling Act). See also Subrin,
supra note 25, at 698-99.
28. See Subrin, supra note 25, at 699-700.
29. ABA, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE
ON FEDERAL RULES 277-90 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938) [hereinafter CLEVELAND PRO-
CEEDINGS] (comments of Edson Sunderland).
30. See Kronfeld, supra note 13, at 595-602 & n.20 (discussing the limited case law au-
thority regarding use of presuit discovery before 1938 in the U.S. and in England, where
preservation-not investigation-of evidence was the extent of the privilege given and not-
ing further that the Advisory Committee drafters of Rule 27 "rejected the notion that [the
rule could be used] when a petitioner with an apparently legitimate cause of action is un-
able to discover facts sufficient to frame a complaint with the requisite particularity.").
31. See In re Ferkauf, 3 F.R.D. 89, 90-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (recognizing that the use of
Rule 27 only for preservation of evidence purposes is consistent with the intent of rtlemak-
ers to lessen the pleading burden on parties for maintaining a claim for relief).
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ally allowed under equity practice or under modern statutes."02 The
Note then cites three decisions and several state statutes, but offers
nothing further about them. In response to a question directed to
him by a lawyer participating in one of the first conferences on the
new Rules of Civil Procedure, Edson Sunderland, the Advisory
Committee Member directly responsible for drafting Rule 27,
spoke about the text of the rule and the intent of the rulemakers:
Under the literal wording of the rule, the suggestion that you
make [that the rule could be used "for the purpose of discov-
ery"] might be possible. The rule provides that the petition
shall show, first, that the petitioner expects to be a party to an
action cognizable in the court of the United States, but is
presently unable to bring it, or cause it to be brought, and he
might urge that he is presently unable to bring the action be-
cause he doesn't know enough facts to draw his complaint.
While that is a possible construction of the language, it was
not the intention of the Committee to allow any such use of
the rule. 4
But if Professor Sunderland was willing to recognize that the
language of the rule could be interpreted as permitting presuit
discovery, even though this was not the drafters' intent, other
members of the Committee were not. Judge William Mitchell,
Chair of the Advisory Committee, followed Sunderland's com-
ments by remarking, "I should feel badly if we have admitted for
one minute that under Rule 27 a man can juggle around and take
a discovery deposition before bringing a suit, when in the provi-
sions on discovery we have explicitly stated he can't do that until
the suit has been started."35 Mitchell concluded, "It is certainly
clear that the whole scheme of Rule 27 is inappropriate for obtain-
ing information in an ordinary suit to enable one to draw a
complaint."
6
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 27, 1937 advisory committee's note to subdivision (a).
33. Some courts have interpreted the cases cited by the Advisory Committee as evi-
dence that the rulemakers' intent was to limit the use of presuit depositions to occasions
when the witness's testimony would otherwise be lost and that no broader use of the rule to
investigate potential claims was contemplated. See, e.g., In reFerkauf 3 ER.D. at 90-91.
34. CLEVELAND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 29, at 292.
35. Id. at 293.
36. Id. In his opening remarks at the Institute, however, Mitchell conceded that
[w]hat is said here at this meeting by members of the Advisory Committee must be
taken with a grain of salt, for two reasons. The first is that officially nobody but the
justices of the Supreme Court know what these rules mean. We have no right to speak
for them, and what they say about the rules ultimately will control. Furthermore, I
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Only in the rarest of occasions have courts departed from this
predominant view of Rule 27's purpose. 7 The sole modem civil
disobedient is In re Alpha Industries, Inc.35 The petitioner in Alpha
Industries manufactured military-style clothing and goods in the
United States. Its national distributors were contractually bound
not to sell outside of their territory. When Alpha discovered that
another company, Mika Overseas Corp., was selling some of Al-
pha's products in Japan, Alpha sought a Rule 27 deposition of a
representative from Mika to try to determine how Mika obtained39
the goods. Petitioner's position was that the overseas exports were
a result either of a breach of contract by one of its own distributors
or were counterfeited by Mika. Thus, the Rule 27 deposition would
allow it to determine who should be named as the proper defen-
dant in a copyright or trademark infringement action under the
Lanham Act.
40
Mika argued, citing the prevailing interpretation of the rule,
that a presuit deposition is not to be used as a method of discovery
to determine whether a cause of action exists or, even if it is known
that a cause of action exists, to determine against whom it may be
brought.4' The rule, Mika said should be limited to perpetuating
testimony when a petitioner can show that the evidence sought is
in danger of being lost or destroyed. Rejecting Mika's argument,
the district judge granted the presuit deposition request. The court
found convincing the argument that the presuit deposition was
think it was Lord Bacon who said that a person who drafted a document was least
qualified to interpret it, because he always had in mind what he intended to say
rather than what he actually said.
Id. at 179.
37. See, e.g., Bowles v. Pure Oil Co., 5 F.R.D. 300 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (expressing an early
interpretation of Rule 27 suggesting that the only requirement under the rule is to show
that there "is at least reasonable ground to believe that a cause of action exists, and can be
proved if the necessary facilities are afforded him"). In Reints v. Sheppard, 90 F.R.D. 346
(M.D. Pa. 1981), the court commented in dicta that while investigatory presuit discovery is
not the "type of discovery envisioned in Rule 27(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the court would be willing to grant such a request in a situation where plaintiff truly did not
have knowledge of sufficient facts to plead his case." The court denied the Rule 27 request,
however, because it found that the information sought in the case was not in the exclusive
possession of the defendant. Two other modern cases treat Rule 27 more expansively than
most, but in both instances the deponent's age and/or poor health were also cited as rea-
sons for granting the petition. See In re Town of Amenia, N.Y., 200 F.R.D. 200, 202-03
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); In rePetition of Delta Quarries & Disposal, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 68, 69-70 (M.D.
Pa. 1991).
38. In reAlpha Indus., Inc., 159 F.R.D. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
39. Id. at 456-57.
40. Id. at 457.
41. Id.
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authorized if suit would otherwise be barred by the requirements
of Rule 11:
Petitioner cannot bring the suit immediately because Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 prohibits petitioner from bringing
an action either against all of its many distributors-four in
the U.S. and over a dozen worldwide-where it does not know
the identity of the distributor(s) who may be in breach of the
agreement with petitioner; or against respondent for selling
counterfeit goods where petitioner cannot be sure whether
respondent is selling counterfeit goods.
Citing a passage from Moore's Federal Practice on Rule 27, the
court concluded that "the danger of loss attendant upon all evi-
dence through lapse of time" was sufficient to come within the rule
since petitioner would be unable to bring suit until it learned how
the goods came to be exported to Japan, a fact Alpha could not
obtain except by recourse to Rule 27 .
Other courts have recognized a relationship between Rule 11
and Rule 27 , but rarely have similarly extended an investigatory
right under Rule 27 to investigate potential claims or even to con-
firm the proper defendant to sue. Most have rejected the attempt
to justify the presuit deposition by reference to the sanctions rule.43
The best example is In re Ford,46 where a presuit deposition was
sought of the county sheriff by a woman whose father had been
killed by the police. Her petition explained that she wanted to take
the deposition to determine who had shot him and whether the
shooting was justified. She took the position that Rule 11
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., In re Town of Amenia, 200 F.R.D. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting Rule 27
petition where deposition was sought on matters relevant to town's claim for contribution
for the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) landfill costs and observing that Rule 11 "must be read consistently with the
exception to Rule 27"); In re Petition of Delta Quarries, 139 F.R.D. 68, 69 (M.D. Pa. 1991)
(noting, in the course of granting a Rule 27 petition, that "the applications of Rule 11 have
evolved significantly in recent years, and counsel's concerns with respect to his Rule 11 obli-
gations are much appreciated....").
45. See, e.g., In re Landry-Bell, 232 F.R.D. 266, 266, 267 (W.D. La. 2005) (denying leave
to take a Rule 27 deposition of a person petitioner believed-but could not yet confirm-
was responsible for harassing her by posting her picture and other personal information on
adult websites and noting, inter alia, that "[d]espite the obvious sympathies that flow from
the allegations of the Petition," and that "[t]he court is certainly sympathetic to Petitioner's
plight," Rule 27 does not authorize a deposition for investigatory purposes).
46. In ir Ford, 170 F.R.D. 504 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
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precluded her from bringing an action before she had the deposi-
tion testimony she sought.
4 7
Concluding that the decision in Alpha Industries misread the
academic commentary from Professor Moore and mistakenly al-
lowed a presuit deposition to be taken for investigatory purposes,
the court was plainspoken and sensitive but, ultimately, unmoved
by petitioner's dilemma:
The court is not without sympathy for Ford. She is under-
standingly deeply troubled by and concerned about the
shooting death of her father. If a law enforcement officer was
at fault she desires to have him or her held accountable in a
court of law. But, under Rule 11, she cannot file suit against
any one without first having uncovered some 'evidentiary
support' for holding the person liable or having obtained
some preliminary evidence that there is likely to be some 'evi-
dentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery .... ' However, without the discov-
ery incident to litigation, Ford is without the means to
uncover whether her father was a victim of foul play in viola-
tion of a clearly established federal right. Her predicament is
a 'Catch 22.' Indeed, she must feel that, under the rules estab-
lished by our civil justice system, a law enforcement officer
can get away with murder.48
In hindsight, the petitioner's decision to predicate her request
for a presuit deposition on the claim that filing suit without secur-
ing the testimony would amount to a violation of the sanctions rule
seems less than prudent. Would the district judge have allowed her
to take discovery in the ordinary course of the litigation had she
simply filed suit first? Or, would he have granted a dispositive mo-
tion and, correspondingly, sanctioned her for proceeding without
adequate evidence? In the prevailing, cramped structure of Rule
27, the lesson of In re Ford for other prospective plaintiffs is unmis-
takable: punctilious compliance with Rule 11 comes with an
unacceptably high risk.
Rule 27 expressly preserves independent actions to perpetuate
testimony, a holdover from pre-merger days when the equitable bill
of discovery was one of the only means by which discovery could be
obtained. Rule 27(c) has been interpreted as permitting the main-
tenance of independent actions only for the same purpose for
47. Id. at 507-08.
48. Id. at 509.
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which Rule 27 may be invoked: that is, to preserve testimony, not to
investigate potential claims.49 While nearly all federal courts hew to
a narrow interpretation of Rule 27, on a few occasions federal
judges have invoked a general inherent power to allow the mainte-
nance of separate proceedings for broader discovery purposes. To
understand these decisions, it is necessary to go back in time to
1970.
Before 1970, it was unclear whether the courts could order an
inspection of tangible property in the control of a nonparty when
it could not be easily brought to a deposition (like real property or
a large piece of machinery) . In 1970, to address this uncertainty,
the Advisory Committee added Rule 34(c) and a clarifying note
explaining that "it is occasionally necessary to enter land or inspect
large tangible things in the possession of a person not a party ....
[T] his subdivision makes clear that Rule 34 does not preclude in-
dependent actions for discovery against persons not parties."5' In
this context, then, the independent action was another use of the
old equitable bill of discovery procedure; that is, it allowed parties
to bring a proceeding for the sole purpose of compelling the de-
sired production of information when no Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure could be used. 2 Lubrin v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp."
illustrates how some courts seized the remaining equitable author-
ity to permit broader presuit discovery for investigatory purposes.
In Lubrin, an employee was injured from exposure to chemicals
released from a cargo manifold and tank. He asked his employer,
the owner of the property where the equipment was found, to tell
him who made the equipment and to give him permission to in-
spect it. When his requests were refused, he filed "an equitable
action" against the employer to inspect the equipment and to ob-
tain a Rule 30(b) (6) deposition of a corporate representative. 4
The information he sought was necessary, the court recognized,
because the employee "[would] be unable to determine the manu-
facturer or supplier of the [] cargo manifold near tank without
[the employer's] assistance."' Thus, he must "force a non-party in
49. See supra notes 21-24.
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c) & advisory committee's note to 1970 Amendment Subdivision
(c).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Reilly Tar Chem. Corp. v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 589 F. Supp. 275, 278-79
(D. Minn. 1984); Wimes v. Eaton Corp., 573 F. Supp. 331, 335-37 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Huynh v.
Werke, 90 F.R.D. 447, 450 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Home Ins. Co v. First Nat'l Bank of Rome, 89
F.R.D. 485, 488-89 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
53. Lubrin v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 109 F.R.D. 403 (D.V.I. 1986).
54. Id. at 404.
55. Id.
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an anticipated tort suit to supply him with information he needs
for determining whether a third-party may be liable for his inju-
ries. 0 6 The court acknowledged that Rule 27 precluded a separate
action for discovery purposes. Nonetheless, relying on the 1970
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 34, the court allowed the discov-
ery finding that "the Federal Rules do not preclude equitable
actions for the purpose of discovery.",
7
Further amendments in 1991 to Rules 34 and 45, however,
probably have eliminated most-if not all-legitimate grounds for
resort to an independent equitable action, which may be one rea-
son that there are no other decisions like Lubrin. Rule 45 now
expressly authorizes the issuance of a subpoena to a nonparty to
compel the production of books, documents, or other tangible
things, as well as the inspection of premises not in the possession
of a party.58 The 1991 Advisory Committee Notes suggest that there
is almost no need for a court to invoke an inherent power outside
of the Federal Rules to authorize an equitable discovery action. 59
Consequently, since 1991 courts typically decline to exercise their
authority to allow the maintenance of equitable bills of discovery.6°
Where equitable bills have been allowed post-1991, the decisions
rest on dubious legal grounds. For instance, in Prudential Property
& Casualty Insurance Co. v. American Plywood Ass'n, l the federal
magistrate judge permitted a "pure bill of discovery" for the pur-
pose of obtaining information within the defendant's knowledge to
56. Id.
57. Id. at 405.
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C), (b)(1). Before 1991, a party could invoke Rule 45 to
compel nonparties to produce documents and other tangible things for inspection, but the
procedure was a bit cumbersome because the courts interpreted the rule to require that the
production occur in the course of a deposition. Thus, a Rule 45 deposition was referred to
as a "document deposition" because what usually happened was that the custodian of the
records would simply show up at the designated time for the deposition and on the record
produce the documents and swear to their authenticity. 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, AR-
THUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2209, at 392
(2d ed. 1994).
59. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34, 1991 advisory committee's note ("This amendment reflects
the change effected by revision of Rule 45 to provide for subpoenas to compel non-parties
to produce documents and things and to submit to inspections of premises. The deletion of
the text of the former paragraph is not intended to preclude an independent action for
production of documents or things or for permission to enter upon land, but such actions
may no longer be necessary in light of this revision.").
60. See, e.g., Franklin v. Turner, Civ. No. 92-891-FR, 1992 U.S. Dist. WL 252121, at *1
(D. Or. Sept. 25, 1992) (dismissing plaintiff's "equitable bill of discovery" following amend-
ment of Rule 45 because, since "Rules 34 and 45 allow for the production of documents in
the possession of third parties, [the petitioner] need not file a separate cause of action to
obtain the material he seeks.").
61. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Am. Plywood Ass'n, Nos. 932026CIV, 1994 WL
463527 (S.D. Fla. Aug 3, 1994).
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aid in the drafting of a lawsuit. 2 The court relied on Florida state
law that allowed such actions.63 That petitioner's request would
have been forbidden by Rule 27 was not addressed by the court
(nor, apparently, was it raised by the defendant). While courts may
have inherent power where the rules are not inconsistent, they are
not supposed to act in contravention of an existing rule of proce-
dure.64
2. Predominant State Practice Mirrors Narrowness of Federal Rule
Most states have adopted the federal version of Rule 2765 and
have given their state rule a similarly cramped interpretation. Even
where textual variances exist in the state and federal rules, few
courts have sanctioned any broader confirmatory or investigatory
uses of presuit discovery. In Vermont, for example, Rule 27 has
language slightly different from the federal rule:
A person who desires to perpetuate testimony or to obtain
discovery under Rule 34 or 35 regarding any matter that may
be cognizable in any court of the state may file a verified peti-
tion in the superior court in the county of the residence of
any expected adverse party.
66
And, in a later section, the rule continues:
If the Presiding Judge is satisfied that the perpetuation of the
testimony or other discovery may prevent a failure or delay of
justice, the judge shall make an order designating or describ-
ing the persons whose depositions may 'be taken and
specifying the subject matter of the examination and whether
the depositions shall be taken upon oral examination or writ-
ten questions; or shall make an order designating or
describing the persons from whom discovery may be sought
under Rule 34 and specifying the objects of such discovery; or
62. Id. at *1, 4.
63. Id. at *2.
64. See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397, 1407
(5th Cir. 1993) (noting that "although a court may have inherent power to do that which is
not specifically provided for in the Rules, it may not do that which the Rules plainly forbid").
65. See, e.g., HAW. R. Civ. P. 27; IDAHO R. Civ. P. 27(a)(1)-(c); ME. R. CIv. P. 27; MASS.
R. Civ. P. 27; MINN. R. Civ. P. DIST. Ci. 27.01-03; Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.02; MONT. R. Civ. P. 27
(a)-(c); NEB. R. Civ. P. 27; N.M. R. Civ. P. DIsT. CT. 1-027; S.C. R. Civ. P. 27; UTAH R. Ci'. P.
27; WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 27; W. VA. R. Civ. P. 27.
66. VT. R. Civ. P. 27(a) (1).
WIN TER 2007]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
shall make an order for a physical or mental examination as
provided in Rule 35 (a) .7
But if the rule's language, "to perpetuate testimony or to obtain
discovery under Rule 34 or 35 regarding any matter that may be cognizable
in any court,"' suggests to some that a broader use may be author-
ized,69 there are no cases approving presuit investigatory discovery
in Vermont.
A number of other states similarly have rules whose language
varies from the federal rule, but whose courts continue to offer a
cramped reading of the scope of authority to undertake presuit
discovery for more than perpetuation purposes.0
B. Presuit Discovery for Confirmatory Purposes
By contrast to the predominant rule in most jurisdictions, some
states permit presuit discovery not only to preserve testimony, but
also to confirm the proper defendant to sue and/or the factual
allegations that will be included in a suit. Among those that permit
presuit discovery by prospective claimants for confirmatory pur-
poses, two different sources of authority are invoked.
67. VT. R. Cirv. P. 27(a) (3).
68. VT. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(1) (emphasis added).
69. Cf Ex Parte Anderson, 644 So. 2d 961, 965 (Ala. 1994) (observing that Alabama's
presuit discovery rule was patterned after both the federal and Vermont rule and anticipat-
ing that if the question were presented squarely to it, the Vermont Supreme Court "might
treat Vermont Rule 27 as a preaction discovery device available for purposes other than the.
perpetuation of evidence, if the production of the evidence would 'prevent a failure or delay
of justice.'"); see infra text accompanying notes 83-86. But see McNett v. Alyeska Pipeline
Servs. Co., 856 P.2d 1165, 1168-69 (Alaska 1993) (interpreting In re Burlington Bagel Bakery,
Inc., 549 A.2d 1044, discussed infra note 85, as not authorizing presuit investigatory discov-
ery).
70. See, e.g., McNett, 856 P.2d at 1167-69 (discussing ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 27)); Block v
Superior Court, 219 Cal. App. 2d 469 (1963) (discussing CAL. CODE CIv. § 2035.010); Rozek
v. Christen, 387 P.2d 425 (Colo. 1963) (discussing COLO. R. Civ. P. 27); Frye v. Massie, 450
N.E.2d 411 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (discussing ILL. SuP. CT. R. Civ. P. TRIAL CT. 217); State v.
Jablonski, 590 N.E.2d 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing IND. K. TRIAL P. 27); Wiles v.
Myerley, 210 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1973) (discussing IowA R. Civ. P. 1.721-1.729); Meredith v.
Wilson, 423 S.W.2d 519 (Ky. 1968) (discussing KY. R. Civ. P. 27.01-03); In re Vermillion
Parish Sch. Bd., 357 So. 2d 1295 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (discussing LA. CODE CiV. P. § 1429-
1430); Allen v. Allen, 659 A.2d 411 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (discussing MD. R. P. CIRC.
CT. 2-204). But seeALA. R. Civ. P. 27, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 83-86.
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1. Broader Grant of Authority by Rule
Some jurisdictions authorize a broader grant of presuit discovery
for confirmatory purposes by rule. Section 3102(c) of the New
York Civil Practice Rule, for example, provides:
Before an action is commenced, disclosure to aid in bringing
an action, to preserve information or to aid in arbitration,
may be obtained, but only by court order. The court may ap-
point a referee to take testimony.7'
What it means to "aid in bringing an action" is the focus of many
of the cases. The question has triggered substantive debate over
the dangers of expanding the use of presuit discovery for purposes
beyond merely preserving witness testimony. One of the principal
arguments made by opponents of a more expansive presuit deposi-
tion rule is that lawyers may abuse it, such as by trying to discover a
basis for suit that they did not previously possess. Justice Bergan
wrote about this precise risk of an expansive reading of the state
rule in 1957:
If he does not have a describable sense of the wrong that he
thinks hurts him, he ought not be allowed ajudicial franchise
to penetrate into another party's affairs, either by examina-
tion or inspection, to find out whether he ought to sue or
ought not to sue. If such a practice be sanctioned, mere suspi-
cion could invoke troublesome and expensive procedures
against a party without any need of showing good cause; and
without remedial protection to such a party; and what is per-
haps worse, the opportunity for annoyance and intrusion with
the aid ofjudicial power would be quite unlimited. The vagu-
est sort of apprehension could set in motion legal machinery
with heavy impact on a purported adverse party; and there
would be nothing vague about the weight of the impact.
72
In an apparent nod to the kind of concerns expressed years ago
by Justice Bergan, the courts in New York have interpreted the lan-
guage in the state rule narrowly to preclude prospective plaintiffs
from using presuit discovery to "fish" around to see if they have a
legal claim to assert. Thus, even though section 3102 could be read
even more expansively, the courts have attempted to limit the rule
71. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3102(c) (Consol. 2006).
72. Stewart v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 3 A.D.2d 582, 583-84 (N.Y App. Div. 1957).
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so that it may not be used to investigate whether a cause of action
exists, to confirm the proper party to sue, or to supplement factual
allegations regarding a claim already known to exist. As an inter-
mediate appellate court recently observed, "Pre-action discovery
may be appropriate to preserve evidence or to identify potential
defendants; however, it cannot be used by a prospective plaintiff to
ascertain whether he has a cause of action at all.",3 This is a key
limitation imposed on presuit discovery taken under the New York
rule. When a section 3102 petition is filed "to aid in bringing an
action," the restrictive interpretation by New York's courts means
that the party seeking the discovery must demonstrate that she al-
ready possesses a cause of action. As a consequence, petitions for
presuit discovery to gather relevant information about a prospec-
tive defendant's conduct or knowledge are denied, even when the
petitioner's motive appears entirely reasonable.
For instance, In re Pelley74 involved a suit brought after a fall on a
public sidewalk. What the plaintiff believed-but did not have any
evidence of before filing suit-was that the town knew of the defec-
tive condition of the sidewalk before her husband's accident but
had not taken steps to repair it. To determine what the town knew,
she filed a presuit disclosure petition under section 3102(c). 75 The
court rejected the petition, noting that "the plaintiff desires to as-
certain whether sufficient facts exist to create a meritorious cause
of action" against the prospective defendant and that the rule "will
not be permitted to merely enable plaintiff to ascertain whether
facts exist sufficient to create a meritorious cause of action."76 We
do not know what happened to Mrs. Pelley, though one presumes
that, after her failed bid to gather information presuit under sec-
tion 3102(c), she may well have filed a traditional lawsuit against
the town and used the discovery rules customarily available after
suit is commenced to determine what actual knowledge the town
had of the sidewalk's condition before the accident. It is difficult to
see how the town was better off being named as a defendant.
73. Holzman v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 271 A.D.2d 346,
347 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
74. In Ye Pelley, 252 N.Y.S.2d 944 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
75. Id. at 945.
76. Id. at 945-46.
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2. Authorization for Equitable Bills of Discovery When Text of Rule
is Limited to Discovery for Perpetuation Purposes Only
Even when the state counterpart to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 27 does not permit a broader use of presuit discovery, some
courts have exercised equitable authority to allow presuit bills of
discovery. Florida courts, for instance, recognize a prospective
party's right to bring an equitable bill of discovery even though the
state rule of procedure on presuit discovery, Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.290, only permits the preservation of testimony before
suit when there is a demonstrable threat that it will be lost if not
recorded immediately.77 Yet, even as the state courts have not al-
lowed the rule to be used as a general means of obtaining presuit
78discovery, they have permitted a prospective claimant to institute
an equitable bill of discovery to determine the proper party to sue
or to gather additional factual information.
The leading Florida Supreme Court case explains that an equi-
table bill of discovery under state law "lies to obtain the disclosure
of facts within the defendant's knowledge, or deeds or writings or
other things in his custody, in aid of the prosecution or defense of
an action pending or about to be commenced in some other
court."79 The court noted further that the existence of legislative
acts separately authorizing discovery at law or in equity by other
means than a bill in equity does not preclude the use of an equita-
ble bill because of the court's common law authority. "Pure bills for
discovery have so long been an acknowledged subject of equity ju-
risdiction that statutes purporting to give other and simpler means
of obtaining that identical relief are not regarded as ousting the
equity jurisdiction, at least in the absence of some clear legislative
declaration to that effect."s
Florida courts have rarely exercised the full scope of such au-
thority, however, finding that the equitable bill may not be used to
investigate potential claims, only to gather information in support
of claims already known to the prospective plaintiff. Relatedly, and
as a further consequence of this more restricted interpretation of
77. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.290; see also Home Ins. Co. v. Gonzales, 648 So. 2d 291, 292 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (observing that "the underlying purpose" of Rule 1.290 "is to prevent
the loss or destruction of evidence prior to the commencement of suit").
78. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co., 648 So. 2d at 292.
79. First Nat'l Bank of Miami v. Dade-Broward Co., 171 So. 510,510-11 (Fla. 1937).
80. Id. at 51; see also In reEzell, 446 So. 2d 253, 254-56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (find-
ing that a statute authorizing a civil investigative demand did not preclude an equity bill).
But see Trak Microwave Corp. v. Culley, 728 So. 2d 1177, 1778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (de-
nying a request for discovery because the information was otherwise obtainable in a pending
federal lawsuit).
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the court's equitable authority, it appears that a putative defendant
cannot use the bill of discovery to gather information in anticipa-
tion of suit being filed against it."1 Finally, most Florida courts
have disallowed the use of the equitable bill to compel discovery
from third-party witnesses against whom no claim is contem-
plated."2 Thus, while the state recognizes the existence of an
equitable action to compel some discovery in advance of filing a
formal suit-notwithstanding that a comparable discovery request
is unauthorized under the state rule of civil procedure allowing
presuit discovery-the courts have narrowly defined the scope of
the equitable action.
C. Investigative Use of Presuit Discovery
By contrast, the rule in two states, Alabama and Texas, allows for
the investigation of a potential claim. The Alabama rule is limited
in important ways that the Texas rule is not, however.
1. Interpreting the Alabama Rule
The Alabama rule does not authorize presuit discovery for inves-
tigatory purposes on its face, but state courts have so interpreted
the rule. In Ex Parte Anderson, 3 a prospective plaintiff sought to use
Alabama State Rule 27 to inspect written records in the possession
of a third party in order to evaluate whether he possessed a poten-
tial cause of action. The Alabama Supreme Court held that his
request was valid and emphasized differences in language between
the state and federal rule:
Alabama Rule 27, which is entitled "Discovery Before Action
or Pending Appeal," specifically authorizes "discovery under
Rule 34," without limiting the use of Rule 34 to that of per-
petuating evidence. In fact, Alabama Rule 27 refers to
"discovery" 15 times, never making the availability of Rule 34
as a discovery device contingent on the need to preserve evi-
dence. The federal rule, on the other hand, is entitled
"Depositions Before Action or Pending Appeal" and does not
81. Cf Home Ins. Co., 648 So. 2d at 292.
82. See, e.g., Schwab v. Television 12 ofJacksonville, Inc., Civ. A. No. 91-07031, 1993 WL
169181, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 11, 1993) ("[A] Pure Bill of Discovery may not be used to
obtain information, prior to the bringing of an action at law, from third-party witnesses.").
83. ExParteAnderson, 644 So. 2d 961 (Ala. 1994).
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contain the word "discovery"; it focuses, instead, on the "per-
petuation" of testimony and evidence. 4
While the Alabama rule does not give a potential plaintiff "carte
blanche" to "fish" for a cause of action, the court in Anderson said,
"it nonetheless provides for preaction 'discovery under Rule 34,'
regardless of any need to perpetuate evidence, provided that the
requirements of the rule are met and that the trial court is satisfied
that such discovery might serve to prevent a failure or delay of jus-
tice."8'5 Anderson thus permits prospective plaintiffs in Alabama to
use the state rule to obtain documents (and presumably would also
permit a presuit mental or physical examination under Rule 35),
though the case also seems to clearly preclude the taking of an oral
deposition that is not coincident with the production of docu-
ments to investigate claims before suit. Perhaps for this reason, it
appears that the Alabama rule is rarely used for presuit investiga-
tory discovery.
8 6
2. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202: The Broadest Grant
of Civil Investigative Discovery Before Litigation
By express rule, Texas authorizes the broadest form of presuit
discovery for private parties. As promulgated by the Texas Supreme
Court in 1999, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 authorizes the
taking of a presuit deposition either to perpetuate testimony in an
anticipated case or to investigate a potential claim. The rule pro-
vides that a person "may petition the court for an order
84. Id. at 964.
85. Anderson also discussed the comparable Vermont rule of procedure. The court
noted that both the federal rule and Vermont rule served as models for the Alabama rule.
Id. at 963. The court then quoted from the Reporter's Notes to the Vermont Rule which
provides that the Vermont rule could be used "for perpetuation of testimony or other appro-
priate discovery before action." Id. at 965 (citation omitted). Anderson concluded that "if the
question was presented squarely to it, the Vermont Supreme Court might treat Vermont
Rule 27 as a preaction discovery device available for purposes other than the perpetuation
of evidence, if the production of the evidence would 'prevent a failure or delay ofjustice.'"
Id. (citing In re Burlington Bagel Bakery, Inc., 549 A.2d 1044, 1045 (Vt. 1988) (observing
that the Vermont rule "gives the presiding judge discretion to grant a petition for preaction
discovery if he or she is satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony or other discovery
may prevent a failure or delay ofjustice") (internal quotations omitted)). As discussed ear-
lier, however, no Vermont court has interpreted its state rule so broadly. See supra text
accompanying notes 66-70.
86. Unfortunately, no additional empirical data on the Alabama state rule practice is
available. There is some resistance to the expansive treatment of Alabama's Rule 27. See, e.g.,
Stoor v. Turner, 727 So. 2d 38, 40 (Ala. 1998) (Lyons, J., concurring in part) (disagreeing
with Anderson's reading of Rule 27).
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authorizing the taking of a deposition on oral examination or writ-
ten questions either: (a) to perpetuate or obtain the person's own
testimony or that of any other person for use in an anticipated suit;
or (b) to investigate a potential claim or suit. "s8
Before 1999, two rules of civil procedure in Texas allowed a
party to seek judicial approval to take a witness's deposition for two
purposes before filing a formal lawsuit. The first and uncontrover-
sial purpose, authorized by Rule 187, was to preserve a witness's
testimony when securing the testimony by deposition could not
wait until the filing of the lawsuit. A common example is when the
witness is close to dying and the purpose is to preserve his testi-
mony for future use in an anticipated case. This latter
requirement-that the petitioner under Rule 187 had to aver that
the testimony would be used in a future case she believed in good
faith would be brought-served as a further limitation on the
rule's use.
Another rule, Rule 737, allowed a deposition to be taken before
suit for a different and more controversial purpose: namely, to in-
vestigate a potential claim.8 The text of the rule made no
reference to this investigatory ground, but courts had long recog-
nized that the bill of discovery procedure referenced in Rule 737
was derived from equitable procedures that existed before codifi-
cation of the rule. Rule 737 allowed presuit depositions to
investigate potential claims without regard to whether the suit was
anticipated, unlike Rule 187.9 By requiring a witness to appear for
deposition without a showing that suit was anticipated, and where
the end was not merely to preserve testimony but to investigate a
potential claim, Rule 737 was the more expansive of the state's pre-
suit deposition rules. Moreover, in contrast to Rule 187, which set
forth specific procedures for invoking the rule, including, most
importantly, formal procedures for giving fifteen days notice be-
fore the Rule 187 hearing to all interested parties, Rule 737 was
short and silent on such matters.
87. TEX. R. Civ. P. 202.1 (a)-(b).
88. As Justice Hecht and Robert Pemberton note in their discussion of the court's
promulgation of the new rules in 1999, there was a third purpose that Rule 737 also author-
ized-the taking of postjudgment discovery-that has been mooted by Rule 621a and TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002 (Vernon 2005). See Nathan Hecht & Robert
Pemberton, A Guide to the 1999 Texas Discovery Rules Revisions, § III. R.18 (1998) (on file with
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.hbafam.org/
articles/article001 .html.
89. Compare TEx. R. Civ. P. 737 (repealed 1998), and TEX. R. Civ. P. 187 (repealed
1998); see also ALEx ALBRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON TEXAS DISCOVERY PRACTICE: THE NEW RuLES
GOVERNING DISCOVERY 295 (1999).
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Defense lawyers said that in some instances presuit depositions
were taken under Rule 737 to pin down a witness's testimony be-
fore the defendant was sued and often without notice to the
adverse party.90 Although the deposition was not admissible against
the defendant if it was taken without notice under the rules of evi-
dence, the effect of securing favorable testimony from a key witness
was powerful in that it could be used as impeachment against the
witness if the witness's story were to change. As a result, defendants
often found themselves forced to settle earlier and on less favor-
able terms than if the presuit deposition had not taken place. Even
when notice was given to the potentially adverse party, a related
problem perceived by many in the defense community was that it
was difficult to prepare a witness (or ask questions of a third-party
witness) in the absence of a formal lawsuit with sufficiently detailed
allegations of the nature of the dispute.9'
The Supreme Court, its Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules,
and the relevant state bar committees began looking in earnest at
reform of the rules governing discovery in 1994. It was not until
June 1998, however, that any attention was given to the presuit
deposition rules. At that time, the court issued a second draft ver-
sion of its proposed discovery rule changes. This version of the
proposed rules, Tentative Draft No. 2 (T.D. No. 2),92 basically re-
codified Rule 187 by moving it into the new discovery rules to be
propounded, but made no substantive changes to the text of the
rule. 3 No mention was made of Rule 737's bill of discovery proce-
dure.
Probably prompted by the court's inclusion of recodified Rule
187, the State Bar's Committee on Court Rules (CRC) published a
report that criticized Rule 737 and urged the Court to repeal the
rule entirely. The CRC suggested that the water could be carried
entirely by Rule 187 by modifying the rule to permit presuit depo-
sitions either to perpetuate testimony or to "obtain" new testimony.
The benefit of bringing everything within Rule 187, the CRC main-
tained, was that it made the notice provisions of the rule
mandatory to all presuit depositions and, furthermore, it required
the averment that a suit was anticipated before the deposition
90. See Kenneth E. Shore, A History of the 1999 Discovery Rules: The Debates and Compro-
mises, 20 REv. LITIG. 89, 181 (2000).
91. Id.
92. Supreme Court of Texas, Tentative Draft No. 2 of proposed discovery rules, in AL-
BRIGHT, supra note 89, at app. E, Rule 13.2 [hereinafter T.D. No. 2].
93. See generally Albright, supra note 89, at app. E.
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could be taken-the two key features missing when investigatory
presuit depositions were taken under Rule 737.94
Following CRC's release of its report, the Supreme Court
adopted the state bar committee's recommendations in its third
version of the proposed discovery rules, T.D. No. 3, which was is-
sued for public comment on August 4, 1998.9' At this point,
plaintiffs' interest groups joined the debate, writing to the court to
express their concerns with the proposed repeal of Rule 737. They
argued, first, that the rules as they existed were adequate and not
being abused.96 Second, and more substantively, they argued that
Rule 737 facilitated responsible lawyering. Presuit depositions to
investigate potential claims "can both lead to more efficient litiga-
tion and few defendants being non-suited after expensive
discovery," as one writer noted.97 In many instances, others sug-
gested, a deposition was necessary to determine if a suit should be
filed.99 Paula Sweeney, who at the time was President of the Texas
Trial Lawyers Association, a plaintiffs' bar interest group, and a
member of the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee (the state
equivalent to the federal Advisory Committee for the Civil Rules),
wrote that Rule 737 served as a valuable procedural tool to help
reduce the filing of frivolous suits. "In many instances, Bills of Dis-
covery [under 737] work to avoid lawsuits all together... [T]he
Court, by abolishing 737, takes away the plaintiffs mechanism for
investigating facts in an attempt to avoid filing a frivolous lawsuit. ""
Another writer put it even more dramatically, "Abolishment of
T.R.C.P. 737 further cripples the Plaintiffs' bar and invites frivolous
lawsuits."'00
If the rules were going to be amended, several prominent voices
in the plaintiffs' bar argued, then a revitalized and stronger presuit
deposition rule was necessary both to preserve testimony and to
investigate potential claims. They particularly excoriated the draft
94. See generally id. at app. H.
95. See generally id. at app. D.
96. See, e.g., Letter from Paula Sweeney, President, Texas Trial Lawyer Association, to
Texas Supreme Court Justice Nathan Hecht (Sept. 1, 1998) (on file with University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform); see also letter from Jack McGehee to Thomas R. Phillips
(Sept. 22, 1998) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) (comment-
ing that "if it's not broke, please don't fix it").
97. See Letter from Michael W. Shore to Justices of the Texas Supreme Court and
Robert H. Pemberton (Oct. 12, 1998) (on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
98. See, e.g., Letter from Joel Fineberg to Robert Pemberton (Sept. 3, 1998) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
99. See Sweeney Letter, supra note 96.
100. See Letter from John F. Dietze to justice Nathan Hecht (Sept. 3, 1998) (on file with
the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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version that limited the new rule to cases in which a plaintiff could
verify that a suit was anticipated.'"' Relatedly, they complained that
requiring the petitioner to set forth the substance of the testimony
she expected to elicit was too burdensome, since the testimony of a
witness is often sought without any sense of what they will say.0 2 In
sum, they urged that if Rules 187 and 737 were repealed, the new
rule should include language authorizing the taking of a deposi-
tion both to investigate a potential claim and to develop testimony
in anticipation of a suit being filed.
0
3
The Supreme Court reached a compromise of sorts in Rule 202.
Under the new rule, presuit depositions are permitted either to
perpetuate testimony in an anticipated case or to investigate a po-
tential claim. The rule also requires that notice be given, where
practicable, to any potentially adverse parties before the hearing
on the petition. The notice provision was meant to serve as a safe-
guard against the kind of abuses defendants had complained of
under the old rules, which seem to have been interpreted as not
requiring notice. If notice is not properly given, Rule 202 author-
izes the court to preclude use of the presuit deposition in a
subsequent suit.1
4
The rule has been interpreted by courts as broadly as the lan-
guage suggests.' 5 As discussed above, a number of courts in other
101. See, e.g., Sweeney Letter, supra note 96.
102. See, e.g., Shore Letter, supra note 97. Furthermore, to the extent the draft of Rule
202 required all depositions to be taken in the county of the anticipated suit, the rule was
problematic insofar as venue could not be determined if the suit was not yet anticipated.
The court dealt with this critique by adding two different venue provisions into the rule:
when suit is anticipated, then the Rule 202 deposition is taken in the county where the case
will be filed; when suit is not anticipated, the deposition is taken in the county where the
witness resides.
103. A further critique argued that the fifteen-day notice provision encumbered the
process of gathering testimony precisely when the need for securing testimony promptly was
paramount, such as testimony likely to be lost as a result of death, illness, or witness unavail-
ability. See, e.g., Shore Letter, supra note 97. However, the draft rule and final enacted rule
permit the trial judge to modify the standard fifteen-day notice period "a [s] justice or neces-
sity may require." Supreme Court of Texas, Approval of Revisions to the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, in ALBRIGHT, supra note 89, at app. D, Rule 202.3(d); see also T.D. No. 2, supra note
92, at app. E.
104. See TEx. R. Cv. P. 202.5 & advisory committee's second note to the rule.
105. See, e.g., City of Houston v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group, Inc., 190 S.W.3d 242, 245
n.2 (Tex. App. Dist. 2006) (approving presuit deposition to gather facts relating to potential
claim or even "a portion" of a claim under investigation within the jurisdiction of the state
district court and rejecting an argument that the rule requires petitioner to plead a specific
cause of action, noting it sufficient merely to "state the subject matter of the anticipated
action, if any, and the petitioner's interest therein.") (quoting TEx. R. Civ. P. 202.2(e));
Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 18 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tex. App. 1999) (en banc) ("The
court is required to find that either allowing the discovery may prevent a failure or delay of
justice in an anticipated suit, or that the likely benefit of allowing the deposition outweighs
the burden or expense of the procedure."), vacated on other grounds, 33 S.W.3d 821 (Tex.
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jurisdictions recognized presuit investigatory discovery could play
such a role, but in most instances felt compelled to deny the de-
sired discovery on the grounds that the governing rule did not
allow it.'0 6 By contrast, the broader Texas rule is consistent with the
idea that prohibitions or severe restrictions on a private party's
ability to undertake presuit discovery are inconsistent with plead-
ing and certification requirements and other front-end obligations
imposed on plaintiffs in civil litigation. °'
D. Other Specialized Statutory Provisions
Beyond these jurisdictional variances, some specific federal and
state statutes permit formal processes to compel the production of
information before the filing of lawsuits in particular kinds of mat-
ters. For instance, where documents are in the possession of public
agencies that are not willing or able to produce the records with-
out a subpoena, the information sought may also be obtained
through a FOIA request. 8 In Delaware, investors may be able to
use state inspection statutes to investigate cases of potential corpo-
rate fraud."°' Other examples of specific rules or statutes
2000) (holding that an order granting a presuit deposition is not immediately appealable
when a suit is anticipated).
106. See supra Part I.A.
107. See supra notes 97-103; see also Nathan L. Hecht & Robert H. Pemberton, A Guide to
the 1999 Texas Discovery Rules Revisions at G-17 (Nov. 18, 1998) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/
rules/tdr/disccle37.pdf (noting that plaintiffs' lawyers urged the court not to eliminate
presuit deposition rule, inter alia, on the ground that investigating claims before suit "has
become increasingly necessary in an era of sanctions for frivolous lawsuits, 'no evidence'
summary judgment motions, and other heightened burdens on plaintiffs"); see also TEx. R.
Civ. P. 166(a)(i), discussed infra, note 134.
108. See generally, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000) (requiring
disclosure by federal agencies of publicly available information when requested by a mem-
ber of the public, but listing exceptions which may excuse the statutory disclosure
obligation). What counts as within the bounds of a FOIA request varies with the state's ena-
bling statute. See, e.g., Howard Friedman, Evaluating Police Misconduct Cases, 33 TRIAL 44, 48
(1997) (suggesting that the following types of documents may be available under the Massa-
chusetts statute: "settlement agreements (even confidential ones), police department rules
and regulations, arrest logs, firearm discharge review board records, and internal investiga-
tions that exonerate a police officer").
109. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1991); see also Thomas & Martin, supra note 7, at 88
(arguing that "investors who are concerned about potential corporate mismanagement or
fraud and who have some evidence of wrongdoing can use state inspection statutes to dig
deeper into suspect transactions"). The Delaware courts have approved use of the state in-
spection statute as an investigatory tool before litigation. See, e.g., Guttman v. Jen-Hsun
Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275
(Del. Ch. 2003).
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authorizing""-and in some cases mandating'-the use of process
to compel the production of documents and information for inves-
tigatory purposes may be found. In total, across all jurisdictions
there appear a number of specialized examples where presuit dis-
covery for investigatory purposes is permitted, at least for certain
kinds of claimants.
II. WHY THE ABSENCE OF PRIVATE PARTY INVESTIGATORY
DISCOVERY MATTERS: CONSIDERING THE
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM TEXAS
The use of presuit discovery for investigatory purposes in civil
cases is rarely permitted by statute or procedural rule and is al-
lowed only erratically by the courts. Given the limited scope of the
prevailing regimes of formal presuit discovery, it is necessary to
consider the importance of this condition relative to the larger
problem of access to the civil justice system. To do so, Part II con-
siders the available empirical evidence from Texas regarding the
use of that state's presuit discovery for investigatory purposes by
private parties.
Because Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure is the
broadest state grant of investigatory discovery to private parties,
further inquiry into the rule's use and application by the bench
and bar is particularly valuable. The Texas rule is also appropriate
to study because, prior to the current incarnation of the presuit
deposition rule in 1999, two former rules had authorized the tak-
ing of presuit depositions. In Rule 202, the Texas Supreme Court
substantially modified the procedural requirements for taking pre-
suit depositions in several respects. Promulgation of Rule 202 led
to renewed focus and attention on presuit depositions after many
years in which the enabling rules had languished in the obscurity
of state procedure. Five years later,"2 we are in a position to
110. See, e.g., FED. BANK. R. 2004 (authorizing any "party in interest" to petition the
court to gather information before filing suit from "any entity" relating to "the acts, conduct,
or property or to the liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which
may affect the administration of the debtor's estate, or to the debtor's right to a discharge");
FLA. ST. ANN. § 400.0233(7) (LexisNexis 2005) (granting prospective claimants and defen-
dants "informal discovery ... to obtain unsworn statements and the production of
documents or things").
111. See, e.g., FLA. ST. ANN. § 766.203 (mandating compliance with presuit investigation
procedure in medical malpractice cases); see generally Nelly Khouzam, Medical Malpractice: A
Review of the Presuit Screening Provisions of the florida Medical Malpractice Act, 20 NOVA L. REv.
453 (1995) (detailed discussion of requirements under predecessor statute in Florida).
112. The survey data was collected in 2005, about five years after the implementation of
Rule 202.
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consider the experience among judges and lawyers with the new
rule and to contrast it with the practice under the prior rules.
A. Description of the Available Data
To collect data for this project, one survey was sent to 6000 or so
practicing lawyers and another to approximately 600 judges in the
state. The lawyers were all members of the Litigation Section of the
State Bar of Texas as of March 2005. A group e-mail message de-
scribing the survey and attaching a link to it was sent to all
members of the section with current e-mail addresses on file.
Thanks to the assistance of a sitting justice on the Texas Supreme
Court, I was able to work with the Texas Center for the Judiciary in
e-mailing the survey to state court judges. The judges to whom the
survey was sent occupied a state court bench, either at the district
or county court level, as of March 2005. It is clear that the list of
judicial e-mail addresses I received was less than the total number
of district and county court judges, but why some judges were on
the list and others were not appears to have been random.
A draft of the initial survey questions was sent to a group of liti-
gators in the state who agreed to read through them, take the
survey on a preliminary basis, and provide feedback. The group
was slightly more representative of the defense bar, but the plain-
tiff's perspective was certainly represented ably by several members.
Following receipt of their comments, the survey questions were
modified in several respects before being finalized and sent out.13
The surveys advised recipients that they could answer anony-
mously. The only identifying information collected was the IP
addresses of the computer terminals from where the surveys were
transmitted.
After allotting several weeks for responses, I collected the survey
results with the assistance of Ruth McCleskey at the University of
Houston. The lawyer survey had approximately a 10% response
rate (619 out of approximately 6000 surveys sent). The judge sur-
vey had approximately a 13% response rate (83 responses out of
approximately 600 surveys sent). Thereafter, Dr. Toshiyuki Yuasa
generously helped me code the responses and begin to analyze
some of the results. Further qualitative analytic help came from the
Information and Technology Services department at the University
of Texas at Austin. The data was examined using SPSS, a general
statistical data analysis program. Where applicable, Somers'D was
113. For links to the surveys and to the raw data collected see supra note 14.
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used as a measure of ordinal association. In addition, some of the
data was also assessed using the Pearson correlation coefficient for
continuous data.
After receiving the initial survey responses, a follow-up survey
(limited exclusively to two questions on the frequency of service or
notice of presuit depositions by respondents) was sent to approxi-
mately 300 randomly selected members of the litigation section by
email for the purpose of comparing the consistency of the initial
survey responses. The second survey also increased the sample size
by gathering responses from lawyers who did not respond to the
initial survey. There were a total of 61 responses to this second sur-
vey or a response rate of 20%. There were no duplicate IP
addresses with the responses previously received from the first law-
yer survey.
Lawyers in the second survey reported receiving notice of a pre-
suit deposition at least once at a somewhat higher rate (46%) than
the reported experience in the first survey (34%). The responses
of lawyers in the second survey to the question of experience in
serving notice of a presuit deposition at least once were somewhat
lower (25%) than the reported experience in the first survey
(35%). Given differences in the sample sizes of the two surveys, the
variation was within a normal range. There was a nonsignificant
difference between the two survey groups, both in terms of the
proportion of those who received notice that another had taken a
deposition (chi square = 1.11, ns), as well as the proportion of
those who had served at least one presuit deposition notice (chi
square = 2.70, ns). Thus, the follow-up survey may be taken as some
evidence that the reported experience among respondents to the
initial survey was representative of the larger population of lawyers
in the entire Litigation Section. The issue of extrapolating from
these findings in the specific context of the data on frequency of
use of the presuit deposition rule in Texas is addressed below.
1 4
In addition to the lawyer and judge surveys, publicly available
data on the rate of filing of Rule 202 petitions obtained by contact-
ing the district clerks' offices in all major metropolitan areas in the
state, was also collected. The discussion below incorporates this
data.
114. See infra text accompanying notes Part II.C.1.
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B. Data Limitations
It is important to recognize several limitations with the empirical
data. Most obviously, the publicly available data on the use of Rule
202 was incomplete because it came from only two clerks' offices.
Moreover, the two counties, Harris (Houston) and Bexar (San An-
tonio), are two of the largest counties in the state and, thus, may
not reflect the experience in smaller counties. None of the other
clerks' offices maintained similar information regarding Rule 202
filings.
There are good reasons for believing that the survey responses
are reasonably representative of the population as a whole (par-
ticularly so in regard to the data on incidence of use). Nonetheless,
the survey responses only reveal the respondents' experiences with
absolute certainty. Any extrapolation from a survey of less than the
whole population for which information is sought necessarily re-
quires some degree of faith.
Another and even broader difficulty is that the data will never be
able to answer fully how much access to information affects the
ability of private parties to institute and maintain civil claims for
relief. That is, the data cannot tell us that there will be X number
of different outcomes under an expanded presuit discovery regime
because we cannot know whether broader presuit discovery in any
particular case would have uncovered information that otherwise
would have been unavailable. Nor is there any way to quantify how
many people who would not have sought legal redress will now be
able to-and will-do so after being permitted to formally investi-
gate their potential grounds for bringing suit. That said, if
prospective claimants in Texas are in approximately the same posi-
tion in terms of access to information before suit, plausible
inferences can be drawn that suggest some important and previ-
ously overlooked lessons about the relationship between access to
information and access to court.
C. Findings
Before launching the survey, my conjecture was that I would not
find frequent use of Rule 202 by lawyers in Texas. The case law re-
lating to the earlier rules (Rules 187 and 737) was relatively slim,
and the new rule has only been in effect for about five years. Addi-
tionally, there are plausible reasons for believing that presuit
discovery is not routinely necessary to institute and maintain most
claims for relief. There are usually sources of publicly available in-
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formation, and formal post-filing discovery rules generally permit
supplementation of missing facts. Also, it is reasonable to expect
that lawyers would be reluctant to invest considerable money in
undertaking presuit discovery, especially when there is no guaran-
tee that the investigation will ripen into a viable claim. In short,
without bringing any empirical evidence to bear on the inquiry,
one might speculate that Rule 202 would have received infrequent
use. What the survey reveals is quite a different story, however.
1. How Frequently Are Lawyers Using Rule 202?
Of the 619 lawyer respondents, 215 (35%) reported that they
had filed one or more Rule 202 petitions. Additionally, 209 (34%)
indicated they had received notice of a Rule 202 petition filed by
another person or entity. A cross-tabulation of the results reveals
that, of those who reported that they had served at least one pre-
suit deposition notice, 122 had never received notice of a petition.
Correspondingly, of those who reported that they had received at
least one presuit deposition notice, 120 reported that they had not
affirmatively used the rule to secure a presuit deposition. Another
84 respondents reported experience with both servi ng and receiv-
ing notice under the rule. In sum, then, just about 53% of the 619
respondents (122 + 120 + 84) reported some experience, either
serving and/or receiving notice of a presuit deposition, under the
Texas nile.
The immediate question to address, of course, is the potential
problem of selection bias: that is, whether those who responded to
the survey were more likely to have been involved in Rule 202 dis-
covery than the overall population of lawyers with a litigation
practice in Texas. Self-selection bias, in short, impacts the extent to
which the respondents to the survey were representative of the en-
tire population of persons similarly situated. There are several
good reasons for believing, however, that the data gathered from
the surveys is generally representative of the experiences of the
larger population of lawyers in the state.
First, the responses provided by the lawyers may be compared to
the answers given by the judges. The judge survey results are gen-
erally consistent with the lawyer survey figures. Of the 83 judge
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respondents, 58% (48 judges) reported that lawyers had sought a
Rule 202 presuit deposition at least once." 5
Second, the combined reported figures from the first and sec-
ond surveys were generally consistent. Lawyers in the first survey
reported slightly lower rates of receiving notice that someone else
had initiated a Rule 202 deposition, while lawyer respondents in
the second survey set reported slightly less experience with using
the state's presuit deposition rule; these slight differences between
the surveys were not statistically significant, however.
Finally, the lawyer and judge data are also generally consistent
with the (albeit limited) information publicly available on the fre-
quency of Rule 202 petition filings. The data from the lawyer
survey show that there were at least 447 Rule 202 petitions initiated
by the approximately 200 lawyers who reported some affirmative
use of the rule. Lawyers also reported at least 340 instances in
which a presuit deposition notice was received. The amount of
overlap between the two reported categories is unknown; that is,
we do not know how often the lawyer initiating the presuit deposi-
tion reported use of the rule and a lawyer in the same case also
reported receipt of Rule 202 notice. As a result, it is not possible to
say what portion, if any, of the total figure of reported invocations
of the rule was also captured by the reported instances in which
notice was received. It seems highly unlikely that there was com-
plete overlap in the reporting, of course. But even when using the
most conservative approach, the data reveal that there were at least
447 petitions filed by the lawyer respondents to the survey. The
lawyer survey had approximately a 10% response rate. Thus, ex-
trapolating the survey figures to measure the experience among all
members of the Litigation Section would indicate that the mem-
bers filed roughly 4,500 Rule 202 petitions 16 since the rule went
into effect in 1999.
To test the reliability of extrapolation from the lawyer survey, it
can be compared with the limited public information available
from the offices of district court clerks that tracked the incidence
of Rule 202 filings. Unfortunately, most clerks' offices do not track
Rule 202 filings separately. Fortunately, two of the largest counties,
Harris County (Houston) and Bexar County (San Antonio), do
115. Thirty percent of respondents (25 of 83) reported that more than three Rule 202
petitions had been filed with them. Thirty-one percent (26 of 83) reported that they had
never had a Rule 202 petition filed in their court.
116. Membership in the Litigation Section varies from year to year, but since mid-2001
the section has averaged approximately 7,300 members (data on the section's membership
on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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track the filings. They reported the following, as noted in Figure 1
below:
FIGURE 111
7
YEAR HARRIS COUNTY BEXAR COUNTY
1999 Not reported 33
2000 126 27
2001 152 49
2002 191 46
2003 143 42
2004 135 36
TOTAL 747 233
This data shows that there have been 980 filings of Rule 202 pe-
titions since 1999 in Harris County and Bexar County combined.
Lacking data from the other counties, we can only guess at the fre-
quency of filings there. For present purposes, though, the available
figures may be extrapolated to the population of the state as a
whole. According to the U.S. Census figures, as of 2005 there were
roughly 3,700,000 residents of Harris County and another
1,500,000 in Bexar County, which represents nearly one fourth of
the population of the entire state (approximately 23,000,000). " If
a straight extrapolation model is used, then the 980 filings in these
two counties would be representative of more than 4000 presuit
deposition petitions filed statewide. This is generally in the same
range as the data extrapolated from the lawyer survey.1 9 Because
there is no available data outside of these two counties, however, it
is not possible to confirm a similar rate of filings elsewhere in the
state.
117. Notes and data on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform.
118. United States Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/ (search the "Population
Finder" and type "Harris County," "Bexar County," and "Texas" as individual searches).
119. One would expect that the rate of Rule 202 petitions would depend on the size of
the population and the figures above bear out this expectation. The rate of filing in Harris
County was more than three times the rate in Bexar County, consistent with the relative
population sizes in the two counties. The validity of a statewide extrapolation would also
presumably be impacted by the rate of filings in high population urban areas of the state as
distinguished from lower population urban areas and rural areas, as noted earlier in the
text.
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2. Why Are Presuit Depositions Taken in Texas?
On this point, lawyer respondents indicated that Rule 202 is
used about 40% of the time for the uncontroversial purpose of
perpetuating a witness's testimony; the remaining 60% of the time,
the rule apparently was used for investigating a claim before filing
suit.120 These figures are generally consistent with the information
provided by the judges. Judge respondents indicated that ap-
proximately 60% of the time Rule 202 depositions were sought to
investigate a potential claim or to obtain testimony in an antici-
pated suit. Correspondingly, judge respondents noted that
approximately 30% of the Rule 202 petitions were for the purpose
of preserving witness testimony. It is not clear from the judge re-
spondent answers for what other purpose (s) the presuit deposition
is being used by petitioners.
As part of their presuit discovery, lawyers sought to determine
whether there was sufficient evidence to bring a lawsuit. In his
work examining medical malpractice rates in Illinois, Neil Vidmar
noted that filing a case sometimes "enables a plaintiffs lawyer to
obtain medical records and other material and further investiga-
tion persuades the lawyer that there is insufficient evidence to
continue the lawsuit."121 One may expect a similar phenomenon
where the information obtained through presuit discovery demon-
strates that there is insufficient evidence to go forward. This could
be because the lawyer is concerned that formal legal requirements
may pose barriers to the prosecution of the case or because the
weakness of the suit (and/or of obtaining an eventual recovery) is
revealed. And, when lawyers conclude that the basis for filing suit is
thin, theoretical work by Robert Bone and empirical studies con-
ducted by Herbert Kritzer certainly suggest that powerful financial
incentives exist (principally for contingency fee lawyers) not to
pursue such cases.1
2 2
120. To question number four of the lawyer survey, 38% of respondents reported that a
Rule 202 deposition was necessary to perpetuate the witness's testimony. Additionally, ques-
tion number five asked why respondents did not first file a lawsuit instead of seeking a
presuit deposition. Answers were: to allow me to provide more detailed allegations in the
petition (14.5%); to determine the proper party or parties to sue (22%); and to verify or
refute information given to the lawyer by the client (21%). Collectively, these answers sug-
gest that Rule 202 was used approximately 56% of the time for some investigatory purpose.
121. Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System in Illinois, 93 ILL. B.J. 340, 341
(2005) (citing NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONT-
ING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE
AWARDS 69-92 (1995)).
122. See generally HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTIN-
GENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004); Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency
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Before the promulgation of Rule 202, proponents of a broad
presuit discovery authority in Texas argued, inter alia, that the rule
served as a valuable procedural tool to help reduce the filing of
nonmeritorious suits. 23 Ultimately, it is probably necessary to rec-
ognize that whether Rule 202 actually has reduced the filing of
nonmeritorious lawsuits is unanswerable. It is unknowable whether
Rule 202 is reducing the incidence of "frivolous" litigation because
there is no objective antecedent measure of whether a lawsuit is
"frivolous.' '124 Several relevant points can be mined from the data,
however.
Among lawyer respondents who initiated Rule 202 petitions, a
majority reported that a prime purpose for taking presuit discovery
was to make sure that the case they were going to subsequently file
would be valid under the rules. While it is appropriate not to place
too much value on this self-reported data by itself, more informa-
tion is gained by considering the related question of how often suit
was filed when a Rule 202 petition was denied. On this point, re-
spondents reported that a lawsuit was not filed after a Rule 202
petition denial in a vast majority of cases; however, different re-
spondents reported different rates. Among those who had filed at
least one Rule 202 petition, 83% reported that they did not file suit
after the petition was denied. Among respondents who had re-
ceived notice of at least one Rule 202 petition, 34% reported that
suit was filed even after the petition was denied. Even accounting
for these differences, however, the data show that, most of the
time, a denial of a Rule 202 petition was not followed by the filing
of suit.
One interpretation of these findings is that parties may be treat-
ing the court's denial of the Rule 202 petition as an indication that
there is no basis for bringing suit (indeed, such a message would
presumably be amplified since so few Rule 202 petitions are de-
nied, as seen below). Thus, the fact that a suit is only thereafter
filed somewhere between 17 to 34% of the time suggests that one
ameliorative effect of the presuit deposition rule is to reduce the
incidence of nonmeritorious litigation. Of course, since Rule 202
petitions are denied so infrequently, this is a very small number of
instances and so these positive results should not be overread.
Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22, 27 (1997); Bone, supra,
note 8.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
124. See Bone, supra note 8, at 527-28 (noting that obstacles to doing empirical work on
the subject of "frivolous" suits include "the lack of a clear and generally accepted definition
of a 'frivolous' suit" and "the tricky problem of how to determine whether any given suit is
frivolous").
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3. In What Kinds of Disputes Is the Presuit Deposition Rule Used?
Lawyer respondents who used the rule to serve a Rule 202 peti-
tion at least once reported the following information compiled in
Figure 2a below:
FIGURE 2A:
LAWYERS SERVING AT LEAST ONE RULE 202
PETITION-SUBJECT MATrER OF DISPUTE
Besides "Other," categories registering less than 1% include Administrative, Agri-
culture, Antitrust, Banking, Environmental, Family Health, and Securities cases.
Lawyer respondents who received notice of at least one Rule 202
petition reported the following information, compiled in Figure 2b
below.
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FIGURE 2B
LAWYERS RECEIVING NOTICE OF AT LEAST ONE RULE 202
PETITION-SUBJECT MATTER OF DISPUTE
Besides "Other," categories registering less than 1% include Administrative,
Automotive, Bankruptcy, Communications, Consumer, Environmental, and
Medical Malpractice cases.
As the charts above illustrate, lawyer respondents indicated that
Rule 202 petitions were filed most frequently in business/breach of
contract and commercial cases (27% of Rule 202 filings). Personal
injury and wrongful death cases appeared as a close second at 25%.
Thereafter, the drop-off was substantial.
The information reported by judges before whom at least one
Rule 202 petition had been brought is represented in Figure 3.
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FIGURE 3
JUDGE SURVEY RESPONSES-SUBJECT MATTER OF RULE 202
PETITIONS
Tax Other
4%
As can be seen, in some instances the data was similar, with both
lawyer and judge respondents reporting that approximately 25% of
Rule 202 petitions were filed in personal injury and wrongful death
cases, with another 6-8% in medical malpractice cases. The two
surveys were not entirely consistent, however. The primary variance
was in the high number of reported business/commercial cases by
lawyer respondents and the significantly lower figure reported by
judge respondents.
4. What Is the Grant/Denial Rate of Presuit Deposition Petitions?
According to lawyer respondents in the survey, Rule 202 peti-
tions are granted almost as a matter of course. Approximately 70%
of lawyer respondents reported that their Rule 202 petition was
granted. Lawyers who reported receipt of a petition filed by an-
other seeking to take a presuit deposition indicated almost as high
a grant rate (nearly 60%). While the figures vary slightly, the gen-
eral import of the answers is clear: when a presuit deposition is
sought under Rule 202, lawyers report that the petition is granted
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the vast majority of the time. Judge respondents report a similarly
high grant rate.125
5. What Limitations Do Judges Place on Presuit Depositions?
Nearly 50% of lawyer respondents reported that the court set no
limits or only applied the limitations for oral depositions generally
applicable under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The next
highest answer given, by just over 20% of lawyer respondents, was
that the court limited the scope of the subject matter for the pre-
suit deposition. Another 12% reported that the court limited the
length of the deposition.
Based on the lawyer survey results, it also appears that courts
very rarely set any limitations on requests for the production of
documents as part of the Rule 202 deposition. Just under 9% re-
ported that the judge limited the scope of documents requested in
connection with a Rule 202 petition and less than 5% reported that
the judge did not allow the production of documents at all . 6
Respondents to the judges' survey similarly reported few restric-
tions placed on Rule 202 depositions. Survey results indicated that
on 19 of 77 occasions (25%), no limits at all were placed on Rule
202 depositions beyond those generally found in the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure for oral depositions. Respondents reported lim-
iting the length of Rule 202 depositions 20% of the time; the scope
of the subject matter was limited 30% of the time; and the scope of
documents to be produced was limited only 13% of the time. Re-
spondents reported that the production of documents was entirely
disallowed in 5% of the cases.
125. The judge survey data, not entirely complete, reflects that Rule 202 petitions were
granted 53% of the time. Only 7% ofjudge respondents reported that they had ever denied
a petition. The remaining petition rulings are unaccounted for; one explanation may be
that they were resolved before the court was required to rule. If we focus on the 50 petitions
for which detailed information was given by the judge respondents, then the grant rate re-
ported byjudges was 88% and the denial rate only 12%.
126. Although the answers given by lawyers who received notice of a Rule 202 petition
invoked by someone else were very similar for the most part (e.g., 50% reported that the
court placed no limits on Rule 202 deposition or applied limits from Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, 23% reported that the court limited the scope of the subject matter of the Rule
202 deposition, and 13% reported that the court limited the length of the Rule 202 deposi-
tion), one answer choice was anomalous: just under 10% reported that the court allowed the
Rule 202 petitioner to request the production of documents. Other answers given by re-
spondents to question number eighteen, pertaining to a petitioner's request for the
production of documents for the Rule 202 deposition, however, were consistent with the
data given by petitioners in question number seven (e.g., only 4% reported that the court
did not allow the petitioner to request the production of documents).
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6. What Impact, if Any, Has Rule 202 Had on
Case Settlement Rates?
The role and impact of presuit discovery on settlement rates is a
particularly interesting question, but hard to answer. The chal-
lenges in mining the data here are the same as previously
encountered: it is difficult to measure objectively how much of an
influence presuit discovery has on settlement. Moreover, since
most cases settle, the real question is not whether the taking of
presuit investigatory discovery eventually led to a private resolution
of the dispute; instead, the critical inquiry is whether the case set-
tled earlier or on different terms than it otherwise would have
settled had no presuit discovery been taken.
Certainly, the data from the lawyer survey was inconclusive on
the impact of Rule 202 on the settlement of disputes. Lawyer re-
spondents were evenly split on whether the Rule 202 deposition
substantially contributed to a settlement of the dispute. Addition-
ally, of all respondents who were in the position of having received
notice of a Rule 202 petition, the vast majority (77%) reported that
the presuit deposition did not substantially contribute to an earlier
settlement of the dispute, with 23% reporting that the deposition
did substantially contribute to an earlier settlement.
Other data from the lawyer survey suggests that Rule 202 is hav-
ing more of an impact on settlement of disputes. Question ten
asked lawyer respondents, "If Rule 202 was taken, but no suit filed,
why not?" In response to this inquiry, 40% said they did not file suit
after the deposition because the dispute between the parties had
been settled. No information was available to determine the reason
why these disputes were settled before suit; the role of the presuit
deposition in contributing to the presuit settlement is not known.
Presumably, however, if a dispute between the parties had not
reached a resolution before taking the deposition, but was subse-
quently resolved before a formal lawsuit was filed, then one
plausible explanation is that the presuit deposition contributed to
that result. In this connection, it may be worth focusing on the rate
of presuit settlements reported in other contexts. For instance,
Neil Vidmar and his coauthors' empirical work on medical mal-
practice litigation in Florida revealed that payments to injured
parties were made in over 20% of all reported matters before litiga-
tion commenced and that, for settlements specifically involving
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payments over $1 million, just over 10% settled before the filing of
a formal legal suit.
2 7
Given the high systemic and individual party costs attendant to
the institution of civil litigation, further exploration of the factors
that drive presuit settlement-and the influence that presuit inves-
tigatory discovery may bear on those factors-seems well justified.
D. Inferences
As suggested earlier, probably the most important finding to be
mined from the data concerns the incidence of use of the rule.
The empirical evidence from the Texas experience with presuit
discovery may reasonably be read as indicating widespread use of
the presuit discovery tool to investigate potential claims, with 31%
of lawyer and judge respondents reporting some experience with a
case in which a presuit deposition was taken for the purpose of in-
vestigating a potential claim before the filing of suit. What do these
findings, then, indicate about the role of formal access to informa-
tion in terms of access to court?
1. Use of Presuit Discovery by Prospective Claimants
in Other Jurisdictions
One inference from the findings on the incidence of the rule's
use in Texas is that, if given the opportunity, prospective litigants in
other jurisdictions would also make use of an expanded presuit
discovery rule for investigatory purposes. This study does not for-
mally compare the relevant statutory and common law rules in
Texas with those in other states. Nor does it consider other factors
that can influence judicial access, such as the relative financial
costs-as well as the availability of pro bono legal aid programs-
associated with retaining legal counsel. Further work analyzing po-
sitional differences between prospective claimants in Texas and
outside of the state is therefore necessary. That said, while there
surely will be differences, the relative positions of prospective
plaintiffs in Texas and elsewhere are likely to be approximately
similar in terms of the other factors known to influence judicial
127. Neil Vidmar, Paul Lee, Kara MacKillop, Kieran McCarthy & Gerald McGwin, Un-
covering the "Invisible" Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Insights From Horida, 54 DEPAUL L.
REv. 315, 348-49 (2005). Other studies have shown that many suits do settle early, after only
limited discovery has taken place. See, e.g., Early Endings, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1994, at B5; see
also Bone, supra note 8, at 569 n.144.
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access. To the extent that further work does reveal that to be the
case, diffuse use of presuit discovery to investigate potential claims
by lawyers in Texas can plausibly be read as indicating that, if made
available to them, prospective litigants in other jurisdictions would
also employ presuit discovery for investigatory purposes.
2. Use of Presuit Discovery Rule in Texas May Suggest Impairment
of Ability to Seek and Obtain Redress Where Comparable
Authority Does Not Exist
We may also consider the hypothesis that the data on incidence
of use of the Texas presuit discovery rule suggests that the lack of a
comparable authority impairs the ability of civil claimants else-
where to institute and maintain civil claims for relief. This
hypothesis is neither proved nor disproved definitively by the avail-
able empirical data gathered for this study. The data on use of the
rule shows that prospective claimants are widely using presuit dis-
covery to investigate potential claims. The data does not explain
why the rule is being used for this purpose.
One possible explanation is that prospective claimants and their
lawyers routinely use the rule purely for strategic advantage and
that, even without the presuit discovery, they would still be filing
suit. This account cannot be entirely dismissed. For instance, the
formal requirements for initiating a civil suit are typically not par-
ticularly great. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
notice pleading standard adopted in 1938 has been generally un-
derstood to reflect a low bar for satisfying pleading requirements:
all that is necessary is a short and plain statement of the claim
showing the pleader is entitled to relief.
28
It is certainly possible-indeed, it is probable-that some lawyers
and claimants in the state have used the rule when presuit discov-
ery was unnecessary for filing suit. There are, however, good
reasons for concluding it unlikely that the vast majority of Rule 202
investigatory discovery undertaken in the state by lawyers and pro-
spective claimants has been superfluous.
a. Formal Barriers to Entry
Formal barriers to the institution of civil litigation may account
for the perceived need to gather additional information through
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 8; see also Conley N. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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compulsory process before suit. Over the last two decades and, with
renewed recent fervor, legal reformers have raised a host of barri-
ers against the institution and maintenance of civil litigation.
Notwithstanding the low threshold of Rule 8 of the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (and the comparably low pleading threshold in
most jurisdictions), pleading requirements have been heightened
by statutory reforms 9 and by judicial decision-making across a wide
range of cases, as Richard Marcus'3° and, more recently, Chris
Fairman,' 3' have shown. The Supreme Court's most recent word on
notice pleading takes a further step, more surprising than small, in
this direction.
3 2
Consider, as one example, passage of the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act, by which Congress sought to curtail perceived
litigation abuses in the securities field. While heightened pleading
requirements and other additional legal reforms in the statute
have made it harder for nonmeritorious suits to be maintained,
Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin have observed that under
the PSLRA:
the plaintiff will need to plead fraud with particularity without
obtaining any nonpublic information from the defendants.
Undoubtedly, some plaintiffs will be able to satisfy the height-
ened requirement that they state facts sufficient to establish a
strong inference that the defendants acted with scienter-that
is, with intent to defraud-without resort to the discovery proc-
ess. In most cases, however, only in the unusual circumstance
129. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub.L. 104-67,
§ 21D(b) (2), 109 Stat. 747, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000) (imposing height-
ened pleading requirements in private securities fraud actions by inter alia, requiring that
complaints "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required [fraudulent] state of mind"); see also Thomas & Martin, supra note 7,
at 71 ("[B]y making it much more difficult for plaintiffs to litigate securities fraud class ac-
tions, PSLRA will also have the effect of eliminating some meritorious lawsuits that would
otherwise deter securities fraud or punish wrongdoers.").
130. Richard Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1749
(1998).
131. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARiz. L. REv. 987 (2003);
Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEx. L. REv. 551, 567-568, 596 (2002).
132. See Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (finding dis-
missal of plaintiffs' federal securities claim proper on basis that plaintiff failed to adequately
plead "loss causation" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, observing that "we assume,
at least for argument's sake, that neither the Rules nor the securities statutes impose any
special further requirement in respect to the pleading of proximate causation or economic
loss"); cf, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (reversing dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) and observing, inter alia, that the "liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a)
is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on
the merits of a claim").
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where the defendants have disclosed these facts in their own
federal securities filings, or in the course of an ongoing fed-
eral investigation, would information sufficient to satisfy the
pleading requirements become publicly available.
33
Other barriers to access to the courts, such as changes in sum-
mary judgment practice,' the addition of mandatory early
deadlines for expert witness reports,3 5 and the imposition of caps
on damages3 6 may also make it harder for plaintiffs and their law-
yers to bring and successfully maintain civil suits, especially where
significant informational asymmetries exist between claimant and
133. Thomas & Martin, supra note 7, at 71 (footnotes omitted).
134. In 1999, simultaneously with the promulgation of Rule 202, the Supreme Court of
Texas modified the state's summary judgment rule to significantly lower the burden on the
party without the burden of proof at trial to move for summary dismissal. TEX. R. Civ. P.
166(a) (i). Titled the "No Evidence Motion" the rule states:
[A]fter adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting summary judgment
evidence may move for summaryjudgment on the ground that there is no evidence
of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party
would have the burden of proof at trial. The motion must state the elements as to
which there is no evidence. The court must grant the motion unless the respondent
produces summaryjudgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.
Id. For a general discussion of summary judgment practice in Texas following adoption of
the "no evidence" motion, see Albright, supra note 89. See generally Arthur R. Miller, The Pre-
trial Rush to Judgment: Are the 'Litigation Explosion,' 'Liability Crisis,'and Efficiency Clichis Eroding
Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982 (2003) (discussing and
critiquing motions to dismiss and summaryjudgment practice under the federal rules).
135. See, e.g., Texas Medical Liability Act, TEx. Civ. PR-Ac. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351
(Vernon 2005) (mandating service of plaintiffs expert reports against each defendant
health care provider within 120 days after filing of suit); see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 766.104 (West 2006) (providing that counsel in medical malpractice action must conduct a
reasonable investigation to determine that a good-faith basis for suit exists and that for pur-
poses of this statutory section, "good faith may be shown to exist if the claimant or his or her
counsel has received a written opinion... of an expert").
136. Since 2000, state legislatures in Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Texas, and West Virginia have all placed caps on noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice lawsuits. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.118 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1
(2006); MISs. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035 (West 2005); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (West 2005); OKIA. STAT. TIT. 63, § 1-1708.1F (2005); TEX. Civ. PRAc. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (Vernon 2006); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (2006). Most recently, the
U.S. House of Representatives recently passed the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely
Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2004, H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. (2004), by a margin of 229 to 197.
As of this writing, the Senate has failed to take up the measure. The Bush Administration sup-
ports the imposition of a federal cap on damages in medical malpractice cases. See Press
Release, White House, President Discusses Medical Liability Reform (Jan. 5, 2005) (on file
with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/print/20050105-4.html; see generally Carly N.
Kelly & Michelle M. Mello, Are Medical Malpractice Damages Caps Constitutional? An Overview of
State Litigation, 33J. L. MED. & ETHIcs 515 (2005).
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defendant.3 7 As discussed above, there is some evidence to suggest
that the Texas presuit deposition rule is seen by both the plaintiffs'
bar and the courts as a necessary investigatory tool to overcome
these kinds of formal barriers to instituting and maintaining a civil
claim for relief.
138
Yet another obstacle that impedes access to the civil justice sys-
tem-and one that bears special mention-has been the
establishment of stiffer sanctions codes. 39 Indeed, one routine
mandate in most modern sanction regimes that specifically places a
particularly high premium on access to information at the front-
end of a dispute is the directive that prospective plaintiffs conduct
reasonable prefiling investigations. 4 0 While there is little data to
demonstrate that tougher sanctions reduce meritless litigation,
Georgene Vairo, Melissa Nelken, Carl Tobias, and others have
shown that they likely have the effect of deterring some claimants,
typically those with more limited resources. 4' In Texas, the specter
137. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 96-105; see also Valley Baptist, 18 S.W.3d 673,
678 (Tex. App. 1999) (en banc) rev'd and vacated, 33 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. 2000) (suggesting that
the Rule 202 procedure in Texas "generally benefits potential defendants overall by allowing
plaintiffs to weed out unmeritorious claims through discovery without having to file suit
139. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005 (LARA) is the
most current and important example of this kind of proposed legislative reform of proce-
dure. The bill, which would not only amend and make more stringent the application of
Rule 11 for all litigants in federal court but would also command the federal rule's applica-
tion to all litigants in any state case involving interstate commerce, will by the force of its
intended effect make it more difficult for claimants to prosecute civil suits. The Lawsuit
Abuse Reduction Act, H.R. 420, 109th Cong. (2005). A nearly identical prior version of the
bill passed the House of Representatives in September 2004 by a wide margin. See Todd. J.
Gillman, GOP Court-Reform Legislation Targets Edwards, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 19,
2004, at 24A. As of this writing, H.R. 420 has been voted out of the house judiciary commit-
tee and awaits further action in the House. No comparable bill has been introduced in the
Senate but President Bush has expressed strong public support for lawsuit reform generally
and this bill in particular. See Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration
Policy: H.R. 420 Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005 (Oct. 27, 2005) (on file with University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/
109-1/hr420sap-h.pdf.
140. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b) (Rule 11 certification is that "to the best of the per-
son's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances" that the pleading motion or other paper satisfies the four conditions set forth
in (b)(1)-(4)) (emphasis added)).
141. Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 11--Some "Chilling" Problems in the
Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986); Carl Tobias, Rule 11
Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REv. 105 (1991); Georgene M. Vairo, Where We are
and Where We are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 475, 483 (1991) (observing that the 1983 ver-
sion of Rule 11 was "used disproportionately against plaintiffs, and particularly in certain
types of litigation such as civil rights, employment discrimination, securities fraud cases
brought by investors, and antitrust cases brought by smaller companies"); Georgene M.
Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988). The 1989 Report of the Third Cir-
cuit Task Force on Rule 11, led by Stephen Burbank, offered further empirical evidence of
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of more robust sanctions practice led several commentators to
predict that use of Rule 202 would rise with increases in efforts to
impose sanctions in the state.
4 2
Even where formal pleading and other front-end requirements
on claimants do not objectively pose a significant barrier to entry,
perceptions that judges in individual cases may be more willing to
impose heightened pleading obligations or erect other barriers to
access higher than the formal law might appear to require may in-
fluence the decision of prospective claimants to file or not file
suit. 143
The existence of these various formal requirements for institut-
ing civil litigation provides reason to believe, therefore, that
lawyers and prospective claimants seek presuit discovery not super-
fluously, but as a tool for gathering information before suit on the
limited occasions when such information is otherwise inaccessible
to them through all other publicly available sources. Indeed, the
premise behind the assumption that investigatory discovery under-
taken by lawyers in Texas has been mostly superfluous because
formal requirements do not make necessary the collection of the
information seems rather dubious on its face. After all, you usually
don't ask permission to do something if you don't have to. My five-
year-old son is still learning this lesson, but most lawyers and their
adult clients likely understand that if the factual information they
seek is publicly available, there is usually not going to be a good
reason to petition the court to get it.
Moreover, consider the converse: if formal legal requirements
are rarely a substantial impediment to bringing suit (and, thus,
presuit discovery is rarely, if ever, needed to gather additional in-
formation to overcome these hurdles), then why would lawyers and
their clients not simply file suit and take advantage of the recog-
nized post-filing discovery methods? It is certainly far from clear
what strategic advantages are to be gained from foregoing suit in
favor of first pursuing formal presuit investigatory discovery. There
are several obvious disadvantages to doing so, not the least of
which being that, under the state's presuit discovery rule, the statu-
tory limitations period does not appear to be tolled by the taking
this dynamic. STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD
CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (1989).
142. See MICHOL O'CONNOR, DIANE M. GUARIGLIA & BYRON DAVIS, O'CONNOR'S TEXAS
RULES: CIVIL TRIALS 1999, at 350 (1998).
143. See, Tobias, supra note 141, at 493-95 (discussing the disparate impact of Rule 11
sanctions practice); accord Vairo, supra note 141, at 483.
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of a presuit deposition. 144 Furthermore, the costs of pursuing for-
mal presuit discovery (which presumably will be borne, at least
initially, by the prospective claimant's lawyer in most cases) are not
likely to be seen as insubstantial, particularly when there is no
guarantee that investigatory efforts will ripen into compensable
claims.
145
In sum, as formal barriers to entry are raised (or perceived to ex-
ist) against the successful institution and maintenance of civil
actions, access to information at the beginning of a dispute may be
considered necessary by prospective claimants and their lawyers
before a suit may be initiated. It is plausible to believe, therefore,
that the existence of these formal legal requirements may explain
the decision of some lawyers and their clients to use the state's pre-
suit discovery rules for investigatory purposes.
b. Incentives and Practical Demands to Act Beyond
Minimum Requirements
Beyond formal barriers to entry, a second factor is that lawyers
and prospective claimants may feel compelled to act beyond and
without regard to the minimum standards set by the formal law.
That is, however light or heavy formal burdens of pleading and
proof may be, there are reasons to believe that in nearly all civil
litigation contexts lawyers may well feel compelled to act for rea-
sons that have nothing to do specifically with satisfying formal legal
requirements.
144. See Tandem Energy Corp. v. Texas, No. 14-03-00815-CV, 2003 WL 22349032, at *1
(Tex. App. Oct. 16, 2003) (per curiam) (discussing whether an order granting a petition to
take presuit deposition was immediately appealable and characterizing it as "not an inde-
pendent suit, but [] ancillary to an anticipated suit"); Texas v. Real Parties in Interest, 259
E3d 387, 394-95 (5th Cir. 2001) (characterizing Rule 202 deposition under Texas law as
.only an investigatory tool" but not addressing limitations issue directly); McCrary v. Kansas
City S. R.R., 121 F. Supp. 566, 569 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (Rule 202 petition in Texas "is not a civil
action within the meaning of [28 U.S.C.] § 1441 because it asserts no claim or cause of ac-
tion upon which relief can be granted"); In re Hinote, 179 F.R.D. 335, 336 (S.D. Ala. 1998)
("Petition for Discovery Before Action" under Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 27 "is a re-
quest for discovery, nothing more" and thus not a "civil action" within the meaning of the
federal removal statute).
145. Compare Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice
System, 81 JUDICATURE 22, 27 (1997) (revealing that "lack of liability" and "inadequate dam-
ages" constitute 80% of the reasons why lawyers declined to represent a potential client on a
contingency basis), with Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent
Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 571 (1978) (noting that "[s]ince contingency makes his fee
depend on the outcome, the lawyer would shy away from any case with a probability of suc-
cess so low that it makes the case a poor investment. Thus, it is not at all clear that a
contingent fee encourages groundless speculative suits. Indeed, a contingent fee may be
more effective than a certain fee in deterring such suits").
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The first and most significant factor influencing this desire to
gather information at the outset of a case is the need to evaluate a
case's potential value. Consider the client who comes in seeking
legal representation for injuries sustained following a medical pro-
cedure. The lawyer wants to assess the extent of the injuries, but
this may or may not be readily apparent. The lawyer also wants to
know whether, how strong, and against whom, a case for negli-
gence can be made. The patient usually can gain access to her own
medical records, but the records may be incomplete or incompre-
hensible. Sometimes hiring an outside expert to evaluate the
records will suffice; sometimes it will not. Even if hiring an expert
would be helpful and the lawyer can financially justify paying a
consultant to examine the records, answers may not be apparent
without further discovery.
This one brief example suggests what all experienced lawyers
know: lawsuits are much easier to get into than to get out of. The
ability to invoke formal discovery for investigatory purposes-to
learn as much information as possible and as early as possible-
thus may be seen as a vital opportunity for better evaluating the
factual elements in a case. These factual elements may include an
assessment of the scope of liability and damages. 146 Moreover, be-
yond liability and damages, other practical financial considerations
influence a lawyer's decision to take a case. A principal issue is the
financial solvency of the potential defendants. Lawyers, particularly
those in solo or small firm private practice, are unlikely to be will-
ing to throw money at a matter when there is no reasonable
likelihood of recovering at the end. More generally stated, for
many lawyers the most important question at the outset of a repre-
sentation comes down to this: "Is taking the case the right financial
decision for me?" 4 To figure this out, it may often be perceived as
necessary to gather as much information as possible and at the ear-
liest possible time.
Another and probably equally powerful incentive driving lawyer
and claimant decision-making is the goal of early and favorable
resolution of the dispute.4 Sometimes the marshaling of consider-
146. See Kritzer, supra note 145, at 22-23 (noting that the "contingency fee practitioner
seeks cases that offer a high probability of providing at least an acceptable return, hoping to
find some fraction of cases that present the opportunity to generate a significant fee").
147. See id. at 29 ("The contingency fee structure means that lawyers carry out this
[gatekeeper] function in large part as an exercise in economic self-interest. That is, lawyers
try to choose cases they believe will yield fees at least equal to what they could earn from
either nonhourly fee cases or from other contingency fee cases.").
148. See id.
149. Cf Geoffrey Harrison, Settlement Through Summary Jury Trals, 23 THE ADvoc. 22, 22
(2003) ("Settlement is the only legal way to eliminate litigation risk. Plaintiffs typically prefer
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able proof at the outset of a case may convince the other side that
the claims have merit or, more precisely, are more meritorious
than they would otherwise have thought. Just as prosecutors amass
the greatest possible volume of evidence to bargain from the
strongest position in plea negotiations, private lawyers also may
seek to establish the most compelling case to bargain from the
strongest civil settlement position. Greater access to factual proof
at the front-end translates into better opportunities for achieving
an early and favorable resolution without judicial or administrative
adjudication. It would hardly be surprising, then, to find presuit
discovery being used to prepare cases well beyond what the lowest
denominator demands in order to demonstrate to the court, to the
other side, and to anyone else who may be listening the relative
strength of the claims (or defenses) being asserted.
Collectively, these factors suggest that lawyers and prospective
claimants in Texas, as in most jurisdictions, may be frequently mo-
tivated to gather factual information prior to suit in order to
evaluate the legal and practical viability of filing and pursuing the
claim to settlement or judgment.
All that said, even if the Texas rule is regularly used to gather
necessary information otherwise unobtainable in order to satisfy
formal requirements or address practical considerations, the em-
pirical data cannot be read to definitively suggest that the absence
of a comparable right for civil claimants elsewhere to engage in
presuit investigatory discovery impairs their ability to access the
civil courthouse. As suggested earlier, the Texas experience does
indicate that there is some relationship between access to informa-
tion and access to justice, but the data does not reveal how much
of a factor access to information plays in litigant decision-making.
Based on the current record, it cannot be determined whether
broader presuit discovery in any particular case would have uncov-
ered information that otherwise would have been unavailable. Nor
can it be measured how many who would not have brought a law-
suit but for presuit discovery are now able to do so and are
exercising that option. Despite these limitations, the findings relat-
ing to the widespread use of the Texas presuit discovery rule by
lawyers and prospective claimants-along with the likelihood that
the need to satisfy formal legal requirements and the pull of prac-
tical considerations may plausibly explain the incidence of use of
the state's presuit discovery rule for investigatory purposes-is pro-
vocative enough to warrant further study.
to eliminate the risk by settling for considerably more substantial relief than defendants
typically care to pay.... Still, the vast majority of cases settle.").
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III. THINKING NORMATIVELY ABOUT SAFEGUARDS IN AN EXPANDED
PRESUIT DISCOVERY REGIME
There are a number of reasons to believe that the incidence of
presuit discovery use in Texas is likely reflective of the need felt by
lawyers and their clients to obtain information before suit through
formal process when they cannot otherwise get what they need
through informal means. Because the available empirical evidence
is incomplete, however, we should be reluctant to draw any broad
conclusions from it in terms of how significant a factor access to
information is in accessing the civil courthouse. Much additional
work still needs to be done to examine the role presuit discovery
plays in litigation decision-making in places where it has been used
for investigatory purposes.
This final portion of the paper, however, proceeds on the as-
sumption that rulemakers and legislators in other jurisdictions
have made the decision to expand the existing discovery regime.
Evaluation of the experiential data on Texas presuit discovery prac-
tices offers some important normative insights about safeguards
that ought to accompany a broadening of presuit discovery, should
such an expansion be sought.
A. The Essential Role of Notice
The Texas experience underscores the importance of an express
notice requirement for presuit discovery. During the debates over
whether the existing presuit discovery rules should be amended,
some in Texas argued that there were frequent abuses of the au-
thority that permitted presuit investigatory discovery.5 0 There
certainly have been some examples of questionable presuit discov-
ery petitions in Texas under Rule 202,' though the assertion of
abuse is difficult to quantify and is certainly not readily observed
from a reading of the reported decisions. What could and appar-
ently did happen on occasion was that a deposition of a third-party
witness was taken without notice to all target defendants and then,
with the witness's testimony secured, the claimant was able to nego-
tiate from a stronger bargaining position.5 2 Approximately thirty
percent of lawyers who responded to the survey reported that, on
150. See supra text accompanying note 91.
151. See, e.g., Maro Robbins & Joseph S. Stroud, Sex, Lawyers, Secrets at Heart of Sealed Le-
gal Case, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEWS, June 13, 2004, at 1A (reporting on Rule 202 petitions
being sent to target defendants, prompting cash payments to discretely settle disputes).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
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at least one prior occasion, they subsequently learned of a deposi-
tion taken without advance notice under the former rules. If
approximately one out of every three lawyers reported an experi-
ence where the prior rule was invoked to take a deposition without
advance notice to a potentially adverse party, this would certainly
seem to lend some support to the view that there were (at least oc-
casionally) problems with insufficient notice that justified the
Texas Supreme Court's promulgation of a new rule imposing an
express notice requirement. Indeed, the perception of a notice
problem apparently was one of the key factors that motivated the
Texas Supreme Court to promulgate a revised rule that expressly
mandates the provision of advance notice to all potentially adverse
parties.'" As discussed earlier, lawyers and judges report that pre-
suit depositions now routinely proceed only after all potentially
adverse parties have received notice.
The role of notice in an expanded regime of private presuit dis-
covery may also be considered in light of the governmental
experience with the exercise of its subpoena authority. In this con-
nection, consider one of the most controversial aspects of the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (the USA
PATRIOT Act). 54 Section 213 authorizes "sneak and peek" war-
rants, allowing the FBI to conduct a search of a home or business
without first notifying the target of the investigation.5  Congress
has also authorized most federal agencies to issue administrative
subpoenas. In most instances, the enabling statute does not require
153. There is a textual argument to be made that Rule 202 only requires that notice be
given to persons with interests expected to be adverse to the petitioner when the deposition
is taken to perpetuate testimony and does not technically appear to similarly require notice
when the deposition is taken for investigatory purposes. Compare TEx. R. Civ. P. 202.3(a)
(directing that notice be given "on all persons petitioner seeks to depose and, if suit is an-
ticipated, on all persons petitioner expects to have interests adverse to petitioner's in the
anticipated suit"), with TEX. R. Civ. P. 202.1 (a) (recognizing right to take presuit deposition
"to perpetuate or obtain the person's own testimony or that of any other person for use in
an anticipated suit") and TEx. R. Civ. P. 202.1 (b) (recognizing right to take presuit deposi-
tion "to investigate a potential claim"). Whatever the merit of this reading, Rule 202.5 may
obviate the distinction. nTx. R. Civ. P. 202.5 (recognizing that the court "may restrict or
prohibit the use of a deposition taken under this rule in a subsequent suit to protect a per-
son who was not served with notice of the deposition from any unfair prejudice or to
prevent abuse of this rule"). In any event, no court in the state has been asked to excuse the
failure to give notice of a presuit deposition taken for investigatory purposes when the ad-
verse party's identity was known.
154. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 8, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 28, 31, 42, 47,
49, 50 U.S.C.).
155. Id. at§ 213.
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notice and prior judicial approval. Judicial review only occurs when
the target seeks to quash the subpoena.156 In many instances, if the
subpoena is directed to a third party, the target of the investigation
may not learn of the subpoena until after it has been served and
the material or testimony taken. 
5
By contrast, an essential safeguard to an expanded regime of
private presuit investigatory discovery would require that advance
notice be given to all potentially adverse parties disclosing the ini-
tiation of presuit discovery. With advance notice, the attempt to
invoke judicial process may be opposed and the court afforded an
opportunity to rule on the request after a full briefing from all in-
terested parties. By requiring advance notice to all potentially
adverse parties, an expanded regime of private investigatory dis-
covery would provide more meaningful opportunities for judicial
oversight than is found with extant governmental subpoena prac-
tice.
B. On Judicial Oversight
If advance notice is important because it provides an opportu-
nity to object to the discovery sought, the predicate assumption is
that the courts will take seriously their oversight responsibilities.
Alas, both the government subpoena experience and the experi-
ence in Texas suggest that existing models of presuit discovery
suffer a lack of meaningful judicial oversight.
Although it is said that the discretion accorded by courts to au-
thorize governmental subpoenas is not limitless, 15 in practical
reality the scope of judicial power has been wide.' 59 The lack of
156. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND
ENTITIES 7-9 (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/intro.pdf; see generally Hughes,
supra note 12, at 587-95.
157. See SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 750-51 (1984); see also Christopher
Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 811, 822-26 (2005) (noting, inter
alia, that the third-party subpoena often "eliminates the target's ability even to challenge the
government's action").
158. See, e.g., Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); see alsoWearly v. FTC,
616 F.2d 662, 665 (3rd Cir. 1980) (noting that "[t]he district court's role is not that of a
mere rubber stamp, but of an independent reviewing authority called upon to insure the
integrity of the proceeding" and that the court's responsibility is to remain "fully alive to the
dual necessity of safeguarding adequately the public and private interest" in the issuance of
the subpoena).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). To satisfy the Powell four-factor
test to demonstrate good faith in the issuance of the subpoena, all that must be shown is that
(1) the investigation is conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose; (2) the information
requested under the subpoena is relevant to that purpose; (3) the agency does not already
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meaningful judicial review of governmental invocations of sub-
poena power undercuts a key theoretical foundation for the broad
grant of authority for administrative subpoena power: namely, the
separation of powers between legislative authorization to agencies
to issue subpoenas from the judicial responsibility to enforce sub-
poena compliance. 160 In the post 9/11 era, debate has intensified
over the grant of even greater investigatory power to government
agencies. In particular, debate over the USA PATRIOT Act, and
more recently, over revelations of the secret wiretapping program
President Bush approved, which authorizes the National Security
Agency to monitor the phone calls and email communications of
U.S. citizens and residents without first obtaining a court-approved
warrant to do so, has focused the attention of the country on both
the perceived need for and potential dangers of governmental in-
vestigative subpoena authority without a corresponding judicial
oversight role.
6 1
The Texas experience also raises cause for concern about insuf-
ficient judicial attention to petitions to take presuit discovery.
Lawyer and judge respondents both report that requests to take
discovery before suit are granted almost as a matter of course. Al-
though, by itself, the high percentage of grants does not prove
inadequate judicial oversight, since the high grant rate could be
explained by the robust exercise of professional judgment by the
bar in bringing only appropriate presuit discovery petitions,' 6 the
figures do give cause for concern.
Thus, the governmental subpoena experience and data regard-
ing Rule 202 in Texas suggest that if a broader grant of
investigatory discovery is given to private parties in other jurisdic-
tions, judges should maintain an active oversight role to ensure
have the information it is seeking with the subpoena; and (4) the agency has followed the
necessary administrative steps in issuing the subpoena. Id. at 57-58. Later cases have further
announced that the courts must enforce the issued subpoena unless it is "plainly incompe-
tent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose" of the agency. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins,
317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943).
160. See U.S. v. Bell, 564 F.2d 953, 959 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that
"[b]ifurcation of the power, on the one hand of the agency to issue subpoenas and on the
other hand of the courts to enforce them, is an inherent protection against abuse of sub-
poena power").
161. See, e.g., Eric Lichtbau, FBI, Using Patriot Act, Demands Library's Records, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2005, at All; Dahlia Lithwich &Julia Turner, A Guide to the Patriot Act, Part 1: Should
You Be Scared of the Patriot Act?, SLATE, Sept. 8, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2087984/ (on
file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); ACLU, Reform the Patriot Act-
Don't Expand It!, http://action.aclu.org/reformthepatriotact/primer.html (last visited
November 28, 2006).
162. Cf Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Grand Jury Investigations, 51 S.C. L.
REv. 1, 5-6 & n.24-27 (1999); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (And Cannot)
Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260 (1995).
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that the tools are not misused. Moreover, just as government tracks
the use of its subpoena authority, similar attention ought to be
paid to private party discovery practices over time. 63 This would
allow for a more meaningful public oversight of private investiga-
tory discovery, beyond judicial oversight in individual cases.
Neutral actors such as bar associations, outside interest groups, and
the legal academy have an important role to play in this regard.
C. Conceiving Adequate Standards for Invoking Judicial Process
Judicial review is a vital safeguard for insuring against abusive in-
vestigatory discovery practices, but it is not enough. It is also
necessary to establish ex ante credible standards to govern when
judicial process may be invoked for discovery before suit.
Using the Texas experience as an initial guide, a presuit discov-
ery rule can easily and appropriately require, as current Rule 202
does, that the petitioner set forth: (i) the subject matter of the an-
ticipated action (when suit is anticipated) or the nature of the
inquiry that prompts the petitioner to seek a deposition to investi-
gate a potential claim; (ii) the petitioner's interest in the subject
matter of the deposition or other discovery; (iii) the parties whom
the petitioner anticipates will have adverse interests; (iv) the sub-
stance of the testimony the petitioner expects to get from the
deponent or the written information or documents sought; and (v)
the reason why the testimony, information, or documents are
sought.
In addition to these five requirements, an essential sixth should
be added: that petitioner demonstrate the information he seeks
cannot otherwise be obtained. This latter requirement underscores
that the invocation of judicial process prior to suit must be used
only as a last resort, when the information needed cannot be ob-
tained through other reasonable means'64 In its absence, one
163. Cf Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-544, § 7, 114 Stat.
2715 (2000) (imposing requirement that there be an accounting of the frequency of use of
governmental subpoena power to "ensure that administrative subpoena power is used and
enforced consistently and fairly by executive branch agencies").
164. Even this list need not be exhaustive. Ajurisdiction might, for instance, impose a
bond requirement on petitioners seeking presuit discovery to protect against abusive tactics
that are only revealed to be so after the deposition is completed. Compare Valley Baptist Med.
Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 18 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tex. App. 1999) (suggesting state court acted within its
power to impose bonding requirement on Rule 202 petitioner), reversed and vacated, 33
S.W3d 821 (Tex. 2000). Because I do not endorse in this paper a policy recommendation
that all jurisdictions expand the scope of civil presuit discovery, I am agnostic on the merits
of such a proposal. It may be sufficient to note, however, that imposing a bonding require-
ment may operate as too heavy a counterweight against using an expanded presuit discovery
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could legitimately ask what purpose is served by permitting a pro-
spective litigant to gather information through formal discovery
methods. For instance, the ability to maintain a suit for declaratory
relief may obviate the need for presuit investigatory discovery in
some circumstances. ' ' Petitioners seeking judicial approval of pre-
suit discovery should have to demonstrate that the information
they seek cannot otherwise be obtained, either through informal
means or through other formal process.
Of course, rules authorizing the taking of presuit discovery for
any purpose should also insist that the discovery petitions comport
with certification requirements applicable to all pleadings, mo-
tions, and other papers filed in a case. It is appropriate, however, to
reject a strict requirement that would treat the certification stan-
dard for taking presuit discovery as coterminous with minimum
pleading obligations. That is, the applicable standard in the rule
authorizing presuit discovery should recognize that one might be
able to satisfy the governing certification standard and still appro-
priately invoke presuit discovery. For instance, under Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleader must certify that
the allegations have or likely will have some evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discov-
ery. A potential claimant might be able to meet this standard
without presuit discovery but nonetheless conclude that a presuit
investigation is warranted, either to overcome other formal barri-
ers to instituting a claim for relief or because it is prudent for some
of the other practical reasons explored above. 66 There would seem
few reasons not to allow the petitioner to engage in presuit discov-
ery in these circumstances. This is especially true when she could
otherwise simply proceed by filing suit and using traditional post-
filing discovery devices.
Additionally, there may be occasions when one seeking presuit
discovery cannot certify that the investigatory effort is likely to un-
cover some evidence to support a viable cause of action.
Recognizing this possibility, the Texas rule does not require the
person seeking presuit discovery to allege that a reasonable prob-
ability exists that the discovery sought will result in a viable claim.
The rule provides only that a presuit deposition may be taken "(a)
to perpetuate or obtain the person's own testimony or that of any
other person for use in an anticipated suit; or (b) to investigate a
tool. See Bone, supra note 8, at 575-76 (discussing policy implications of bonding require-
ments in litigation).
165. See Higginbotham, supra note 13, § 27.04 at 27-12.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 146-149.
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potential claim or suit."67 Tracking this approach, a prudent for-
mulation need only require a good-faith basis for believing that the
discovery may unearth facts that would support the filing of a vi-
able claim.'6
The concern in marking the threshold below that of the govern-
ing certification standard, such as in Rule 11, is that it would
encourage abusive practices-"fishing" expeditions is the phrase
often used. As discussed above, courts commonly cite this concern
as the basis for narrowly reading rule- and statutory-based grants of
presuit discovery for the purpose of perpetuation only.' 9 This con-
cern over fishing echoes a concern over permissive attitudes
toward litigation (and dissatisfaction with overly expansive discov-
ery devices, in particular).7 0 The notion that a prospective party
may go prospecting for a claim if too expansive a regime of investi-
gatory discovery is permitted helps frame the essential tension in
deciding the appropriate scope of the discovery right: if the peti-
tioner need not even aver that the presuit discovery is likely to lead
to a viable claim, then what keeps the investigation within reason-
able limits?
What the "fishing" critique obscures, however, is that facts neces-
sary to determine the nature and extent of a legal claim for relief
may often not be known to the prospective plaintiff without access
to formal judicial process to compel production of the information
she otherwise cannot obtain. 7' This problem seems to be precisely
167. TEx. R. Civ. P. 202.1(a) & (b).
168. Cf Thomas & Martin, supra note 7, at 82-83 (arguing that "shareholders would
need to have some basis for their fraud claim and allege a proper purpose for inspection of
corporate information" in order to use state presuit inspection statutes).
169. See supra Parts L.A and I.B.
170. See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Just Say "No Fishing": The Lure of Metaphor, 40
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2006) (tracing "fishing" critique in litigation generally and in dis-
covery disputes in particular).
171. Discussing the heightened pleading requirements imposed by the PSLRA in secu-
rities fraud cases, Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin observed:
While deterrence of baseless lawsuits is a laudable goal, the courts are (or should be)
concerned that this screen will block legitimate lawsuits that would remedy actual
wrongdoing. Plaintiffs with an otherwise strong case may need a method of getting
nonpublic corporate information in order to meet the pleading requirements for
demand futility. They cannot use the normal discovery procedures to fully investigate
corporate mismanagement or fraud unless the court finds that they have made alle-
gations of wrongdoing sufficient to establish demand futility or wrongful refusal.
However, they frequently cannot allege particularized facts sufficient to satisfy the
court and obtain discovery in a derivative action without first examining internal cor-
porate documents. Thus, the plaintiffs in a derivative suit frequently lose if the
defendant files a motion to dismiss.
Thomas & Martin, supra note 7, at 82.
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the reason that the Supreme Court, in the context of the grand
jury subpoena, has recognized the need for giving wide latitude to
the government in investigating potential violations of the criminal
law. Thus, in United States v. R. Enterprises, I" -7law Ths, it  tt  i , nc. , the Court ob
served: "IT]he decision as to what offense will be charged is
routinely not made until after the grand jury has concluded its in-
vestigation. One simply cannot know in advance whether
information sought during the investigation will be relevant and
admissible in a prosecution for a particular offense.'
7
To be sure, there may be valid reasons for distinguishing the
prosecutor's role in enforcing the existing legal regimes from that
of private plaintiffs in enforcing norms through the civil justice
system. The foremost argument favoring such a distinction is that
the government is entrusted with safeguarding the public interest
and, correspondingly, can be trusted to act in the public's best in-
terests more often than citizens will so act in private litigation.
There are several responses to this point.
While it is certainly undeniable that the image of an enterprising
plaintiff's lawyer fishing around for facts on which to base a claim
is provocative, the objection that private presuit investigatory dis-
covery inappropriately allows plaintiffs to "fish" for a claim
proceeds from the a priori assumption that there are no facts on
which a viable suit may be based. If we assume the target defendant
has done nothing wrong and there is, therefore, nothing untoward
to uncover through presuit discovery, then any costs borne by the
target defendant and by society for abetting this kind of presuit
discovery expedition are obviously too high.
Change the assumption, however, and the critique loses much of
its force. If information lies solely in the possession of the potential
defendant and this information, if known, would permit the plain-
tiff to bring a legitimate claim for relief (that is to say, an
actionable wrong has occurred), one presumes that the arguments
for proscribing presuit discovery are substantially muted.7 4 There is
172. U.S. v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292 (1991).
173. See also id. at 299 (observing that "[g]randjuries are not licensed to engage in arbi-
trary fishing expeditions, nor may they select targets of investigation out of malice or an
intent to harass").
174. See Bone, supra note 8, at 563 (developing predictive model of meritorious and
nonmeritorious suits and observing that "[e]fficiency is not the only concern. Fairness is also
relevant because wealth transfers can violate fairness norms.... [W]hen plaintiffs with meri-
torious suits drop, the resulting transfer of wealth systematically deprives plaintiffs of their
entitlements"); see also Thornburg, supra note 170, at 50 (criticizing use of phrase "fishing
expedition" and observing that "[i] 1 n essence, the courts are deciding, without knowing what
discovery would disclose, that no reasonable factfinder could rely on the information sought
to support the inference the plaintiff needs, nor could the discovery reasonably be expected
to lead to admissible evidence").
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also a serious theoretical difficulty with the fishing critique insofar
as it assumes it is possible to distinguish ex ante between those who
say they have done no wrong and those occasions where some bad
act has been committed but only the wrongdoer knows it. Finally, it
is hardly clear that, as a practical matter, a lawyer would insist on
taking a deposition before litigation without any prior basis or
ground for suspecting wrongdoing on the part of another and
would be able to successfully unearth the evidence she only hopes
exists. 
7 5
Even if some will take advantage of an investigatory discovery
privilege, isolated anecdotes of abusive behavior in the presuit pe-
riod no more make the case against reform than do isolated
anecdotes of abusive litigation tactics in the post-filing period. To
the extent that the problem is unscrupulous lawyers filing dubious
presuit discovery petitions, it is certainly unrealistic to expect pro-
fessional certification obligations to give any greater pause to the
lawyer when he acts before suit rather than after. Bad lawyers may
be tempted to act badly in all contexts; this Hobbesian awareness
hardly provides a basis for rejecting the right of all prospective par-
ties to investigatory discovery before suit. The assertion that some
lawyers may abuse the privilege of taking investigatory discovery
does not support a convincing case against expanding presuit dis-
covery unless it can be shown that the invocation ofjudicial process
prior to suit is more susceptible to abuse than is the privilege now
given to private parties to file suit and, thereafter, invoke judicial
process for discovery purposes.
CONCLUSION
To date, debate over reform of the civil justice system has pro-
ceeded without any satisfactory treatment of the role access to
information plays in the ability of private parties to seek legal re-
dress. My goals in undertaking this study have been to describe the
limited grants of formal investigatory discovery currently available
to prospective parties and analyze empirical evidence relating to
the use of rules that permit the taking of discovery for investigatory
purposes before formal litigation has commenced.
Examining the data from Texas demonstrates that there are
plausible reasons to believe that lawyers and prospective claimants
in Texas, as in most jurisdictions, may frequently be motivated to
gather factual information before suit to evaluate the viability of
175. See Kritzer, supra note 145, at 22-23.
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filing and pursuing a case to settlement or judgment. The per-
ceived need to satisfy formal legal requirements for bringing suit,
as well as the pull of practical considerations, thus may plausibly
explain the incidence of use of the state's presuit discovery rule for
investigatory purposes. Read in this manner, the empirical evi-
dence suggests that there is an important relationship between
access to information and access to justice, even if the available
data does not permit us to quantify how significant of a factor it
may be.
Although the limited empirical data does not support a policy
prescription at this time for expanding presuit discovery in all ju-
risdictions, there is value in thinking normatively about the role of
safeguards to accompany an expansion of the right of private par-
ties to invoke judicial process for investigatory purposes prior to
suit, should such an expansion be sought by rulemakers or legisla-
tors in particular jurisdictions in the future. I have suggested that
notice, judicial oversight, and the formulation of credible govern-
ing standards are all essential components to evaluate and study
further.
Whether it is desirable to increase the opportunities for private
parties to bring civil claims for relief depends greatly on one's ori-
entation and attitudes about the civil justice system in general.
Kevin Clermont and John Currivan have observed that opponents
of the contingency fee may object that it overburdens the court
system with too many lawsuits but that, from another perspective,
the criticism is recast "as an argument for lightening court burdens
by closing the courthouse doors to certain meritorious suits, espe-
cially suits brought by the poor.",76 A similar awareness applied to
this study of presuit discovery may serve as a helpful reminder that,
as with all procedural reforms, the real challenge is deciding how
to balance the competing interests: private rights of recovery
against privacy rights, affording access against fostering abuse.
77
Ultimately, the goal of any responsible discovery regime is to
strike the proper balance between the prospective litigant's right to
invoke judicial process to investigate before suit and the risk that
the right will be abused. To be sure, an expansive grant of
176. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 145, at 571.
177. Cf Steve Subrin, supra note 25, at 745 (contrasting discovery challenges in mod-
ern-day procedure with those in the period when federal rules were first adopted and
remarking that "[t]here is a real problem: how to permit discovery 'fishing' sufficient to
reach just results without expeditions in which the costs of time, money and privacy out-
weigh the gains"); see also Bone, supra note 8, at 577 ("The goal of any regulatory scheme,
whether it involves strict pleading, penalties or judicial screening, is ... to strike a sensible
balance between the benefit of reducing frivolous suits and the regulatory costs.").
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investigatory discovery privileges places some faith in the plaintiffs'
bar-or, more precisely, in the ethical and financial incentives that
influence the decision-making of the plaintiffs' bar-not to abuse
the process. On the other hand, a categorical judgment against
presuit discovery for investigatory purposes presumes a different
kind of faith: namely, in the capacity of the civil justice system,
bounded as it presently is, to call those who commit wrongful acts
to account for their wrongdoing.
